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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Religious fundamentalists of all stripes have contributed to, and been 
accused of, the perpetuation of terrorism, violence, prejudice, closed-mindedness, 
and a rejection of the things the modern world has to offer (Dawkins, 2006; 
Harris, 2004; Hitchens, 2007; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Schuefele, Corley, 
Shih, Dalrymple, & Ho, 2009; Wellman, 2007). While many theorists have 
worked to uncover the psychological mechanisms of these relationships, they 
tend to approach this endeavor from the position that fundamentalism is 
dysfunctional if not downright anti-social. Fundamentalism, however, has also 
been linked to a variety of more benevolent outcomes, like physical and mental 
well-being (Genia, 1996; George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Pargament, 2002; 
Sethi & Seligman, 1993).  The current paper attempts to integrate both 
“outcomes” of fundamentalism into a single theoretical account. 
The Psychology of Fundamentalism 
From a psychological perspective religious fundamentalism represents an 
adherence to a set of religious teachings that are believed to contain the inerrant 
truth about both existential and ethereal existence (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 
1992). More specifically, fundamentalism consists of two primary components. 
The first component is closed-mindedness, especially in regards to religious 
issues (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994; 
Pancer, Jackson, Hunsberger, Pratt, & Lea, 1995). For example, fundamentalists 
compared to non-fundamentalists, think less complexly about religious issues 
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such as abortion (Hunsberger et al., 1994; Pancer et al., 1995) and are less likely 
to acknowledge contradictions in religious texts (Altemeyer, 2002). The second 
component of fundamentalism is belief in an infallible authority (Hood, Hill, & 
Williamson, 2005; Woodberry & Smith, 1998), the focus of most measures and 
definitions of fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 2004; Hood, Hill, 
& Williamson, 2005; McFarland, 1989; Woodberry & Smith, 1998).  
The two components of fundamentalism might be a result of the theology 
of religious fundamentalist groups; however, these two components may also be 
especially adept at providing a sense of certainty and cognitive closure. Religious 
fundamentalists are found to have higher levels of the need for closure (Brandt & 
Reyna, in press; Saroglou, 2002), as well as other similar constructs such as the 
intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962) and inconsistency (Feather, 1964), 
suggesting that fundamentalists may desire clear cut answers about and 
perspectives on the world. Closure can be facilitated by an epistemic authority 
(Kruglanski, Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Sharvit, Ellis et al., 2005), that is, an expert 
on the knowledge important for a situation or domain. While an epistemic 
authority is often regulated to their domain of expertise—a history teacher to 
historical facts, a legal scholar to Supreme Court decisions (Bar-Tal, Raviv, 
Raviv, & Brosh, 1991; Raviv, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Biran, & Sela, 2002)—
fundamentalists subscribe to an epistemic authority that not only supersedes 
traditional epistemic boundaries, but is also often considered sacred or infallible, 
providing absolute truth (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Woodberry & Smith, 
1998). Thus, fundamentalists can maintain closure by adhering to, studying, and 
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internalizing the teachings from religious sources. These teachings provide an 
epistemic authority for most, if not all, of life’s many facets. The clear cut 
answers provided by fundamentalism may also contribute to fundamentalisms 
positive and negative outcomes. 
Fundamentalism and Prejudice 
 Religious fundamentalism has been related to prejudice towards a variety 
of groups including gays and lesbians (Brandt & Reyna, in press; Fulton, 
Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Jackson & Esses, 1997;  Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2002; Mavor & Gallois, 2008; Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, LaMartina, 
McCullers, & McKinley, 2006), radicals (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), single 
mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997), religious outgroups (Rowatt, Franklin, & 
Cotton, 2005), and people who do not believe in God (Jackson & Hunsberger, 
1999). In sum, fundamentalists reject those who are perceived to violate their 
values and beliefs (e.g. Brandt & Reyna, in press; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; 
Jackson & Esses, 1997; Mavor & Gallois, 2008). The root of prejudice by 
fundamentalists can be attributed, in part, to authoritarianism (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), the perception of non-believers as 
an outgroup (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999), and teachings that accept prejudice 
within a religious tradition (Jackson & Esses, 1997; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & 
Kirkpatrick, 2002). It is proposed here that one function of religious-based 
prejudice may be the protection and maintenance of the cognitive closure 
provided by fundamentalism (see also Brandt & Reyna, in press). By rejecting 
various groups, fundamentalists are able to discount and reject questions about, 
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and attacks on, their worldview, as well as demean the validity of opposing 
worldviews. 
 Fundamentalism may also be related to more psychologically beneficial 
outcomes.  For example, in one study fundamentalism was related to spiritual and 
religious well-being (Genia, 1996). Similarly, members of fundamentalist 
religious denominations were more optimistic, more hopeful, and less hopeless 
than their counterparts in moderate or liberal denominations (Sethi & Seligman, 
1993, 1994). Even the religious materials congregation members were exposed to 
in fundamentalist denominations were more optimistic (e.g. sermons, hymns, 
scripture readings). These studies also found that fundamentalists attended 
worship services more often (Genia, 1996) and were more involved in their 
religion (Sethi & Seligman, 1993). These results suggest that there may be 
something more to fundamentalism than intolerance, prejudice, and 
discrimination. Fundamentalism may be beneficial to both the group and the 
individual. 
The purpose of the present paper is to integrate past research on the 
positive and negative outcomes of religious fundamentalism by linking these 
outcomes to the perception of both ingroup and outgroup members along a 
continuum of humanness that ranges from the perception of others as less than 
human to more than human. This continuum in social cognition is called the 
“chain of being” in reference to the philosophical idea of the Great Chain of 
Being (Lovejoy, 1936/1964). Specifically, due to the components of 
fundamentalism and the concurrent desire to see the world in clear cut terms, 
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fundamentalists are suggested to use the perception of others as more or less than 
human in order to organize and make sense of their moral universe. In this model, 
perception of others along a dimension of humanness is driven by perceived value 
similarities and differences of ingroups and outgroups (respectively). For religious 
fundamentalists, perceiving the ingroup as upholding and embodying important 
values results in seeing the ingroup as more than human (e.g. sanctified), which 
inspires group and individual promoting behavior. Conversely, perceiving other 
groups as violating religious values threatens the religious ingroup, causing the 
ingroup to protect themselves (e.g. discrimination, dehumanization). Figure 1 
illustrates the overarching model that guides the current research.  
The Chain of Being in Social Cognition 
Jonathan Haidt (2003; Haidt & Algoe, 2004) proposed a vertical 
dimension to humans’ social cognition. Philosophically rooted in the Great Chain 
of Being, this vertical dimension can be anchored in a number of ways depending 
on the culture; but in the end, the top of the chain is the ultimate good and the 
bottom is the ultimate bad. Using the terms of the environment this could be 
conceived as purity (at the top) and pollution (at the bottom), while Christians 
could conceptualize it with God (at the top) and Satan (at the bottom). Put simply, 
it is a hierarchy of morality anchored by divinity and animality, with humanity 
falling somewhere in the middle. Objects, animals, people, saints and deities are 
all located someplace on this chain of being, with gradual differences between 
each link. Haidt's conceptualization of a chain of being in social cognition was 
based upon his work on the moral emotions (Haidt & Algoe, 2004). Specifically,
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Figure 1 
Theoretical model of religious fundamentalism and the chain of being.
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disgust, a moral emotion experienced in response to moral violations of divinity 
and purity (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt 
1999), and elevation, a positive moral emotion experienced in response to 
perceived saintly acts (Haidt & Algoe, 2004), were suggested to be experienced 
and felt when perceiving others as lower or higher on the chain of being, 
respectively. The current research expands on these ideas by linking the chain of 
being to research on sanctification and dehumanization. 
The idea of the chain of being, however, is not new as Arthur Lovejoy's 
(1936/1964; see also Bynum, 1975) quintessential work has traced the idea of the 
chain of being from early philosophers to theologians, scientists, and its eventual 
fall from favor during the industrial revolution. While this fall from favor may 
have been evident in the academic writings of the day, it may have only been 
academic. The continuum may still persist in the lay publics' conception and 
perception of the social world, allowing people to perceive others and themselves 
along the continuum from animal to divine – placing people among the gods, the 
great apes, or worse. The current paper attempts to test this possibility.  
Current evidence suggests that a chain of being that encapsulates the 
perception of others as more or less than human does exist. For example, people 
perceive a variety of agents, both supernatural and otherwise (humans, animals), 
in terms of their humanity (Demoulin, Saroglou, & Van Pachterbeke, 2008; Gray, 
Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, & Suitner, 2008). 
Research also indicates that the metaphor of Black men as apes (or primates of 
some sort) still persists in the implicit cognition of both whites and non-whites 
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(Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, & Jackson, 2008). Additionally, the concepts of good-
bad and God-Devil are perceived along a vertical continuum (Meier, Hauser, 
Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007; Meier & Robinson, 2004). Overall, this 
research points to the existence of a moral chain of being that includes the 
perception of others as more or less than human—including perceptions of the 
divine and the morally reprehensible. As such, the chain of being consists on the 
bottom half of dehumanization (Haslam, 2006), or as some have termed it, infra-
humanization (Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, 
Vaes, et al., 2001). The opposing top half of the chain of being includes the 
perception of humans as closer to the Gods and the Saints, even sacred, what 
some have called sanctification (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005). 
Antecedents of the Chain of Being 
Thus far the chain of being has been described as a moral hierarchy—a 
continuum of social cognition—which persists in the minds of modern humans. It 
may be the case that every person perceives others along this chain of being, but 
it is also likely that certain styles of thinking, beliefs, and personality traits 
exacerbate the perception of other humans as more or less human. Religious 
fundamentalism and the need for closure may be one set of beliefs and cognitive 
styles that may contribute to this perception. 
The need for closure may be related to the perception of people as more or 
less human in order to reduce ambiguity as it is related to the reduction of 
ambiguity. Therefore people who are high on need for closure may be motivated 
to see people and groups they consider good as greater than human, while people 
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and groups they consider bad as less than human. By separating out the good and 
the bad on a moral hierarchy people are able to see the world in more distinct and 
less ambiguous terms. Religious fundamentalists are more likely to have a high 
need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, in press; Saroglou, 2002) and intolerance of 
ambiguity (Budner, 1962), so this group of people may be especially likely to use 
the chain of being as a guide to perceiving the world. 
The beliefs encapsulated by religious fundamentalism may also be related 
to the perception of others along the chain of being. For example, belief in an 
infallible authority could increase the utilization of the Chain of Being—
especially in regards to one’s own group. By definition, the believer thinks that 
the infallible authority is always right, so to the degree that they value what the 
authority represents and their desire to see themselves in a positive light (cf. 
Diener & Diener, 1996; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), a person 
does his or her best to follow the infallible authority. By approximating the 
authority (e.g. via their values, beliefs, behaviors) the person may see him or 
herself as akin to or in the favor of the infallible authority. This reasoning likely 
does not take place explicitly, nor do people come to such a definitive conclusion. 
However believing that you and your ingroup are similar to an infallible authority 
may give moral validation to your ingroup (cf. Bushman, Ridge, Das, Key, & 
Busath, 2007). Indeed, people do reason similarly about themselves and God 
(Epeley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, & Cacioppo, 2009), believing that God 
agrees with their position on a variety of social and moral issues. Belief that one’s 
own group has an infallible source of authority indicates, by extension, that 
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religious outgroups do not have the same source of authority. People who do not 
submit to the same infallible source of moral authority and instead symbolically 
violate the values, morals, and worldview of the ingroup are thus, inherently less 
moral. This leads to a view of the outgroup as less pure, holy, or sanctified than 
the ingroup, which can in turn justify the exclusion or persecution of the 
outgroup. 
Dehumanization 
Dehumanization and the related process infra-humanization are the 
perception of humans as less than fully human (Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Fiske, 
Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres et al., 2003; Haslam, 2006) and consist of “the denial 
of full humanness to others” (Haslam, 2006, p. 252) or the attribution of “an 
incomplete human essence” to outgroups (Leyens et al., 2001, p. 396). Some 
work has attempted to document why some groups are dehumanized and others 
are not. Several cognitive and motivational factors contribute to the perception of 
humanity including psychological distance (Opotow, 1990; see also Trope & 
Lieberman, 2003) and a lack of empathy (Halpern & Weinstein, 2004). The most 
common explanation for the dehumanization of outgroups comes from the social 
identity perspective. This perspective suggests that the social categorization 
process (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) leads people to attribute less of a human essence 
to outgroups than to ingroups (Demoulin, Torres, Perez, Paladino, Pozo, Leyens 
et al, 2004). Social categorization may also lead people to perceive outgroups as 
threatening entities (Wilder, 1986). Building on this latter suggestion and adding 
to the list of factors influencing the perceptions of humanity, the current studies 
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suggest the components of religious fundamentalism and its related cognitive 
styles—belief in an infallible authority and the need for closure—contribute to 
the perception of others as more or less human. The current study is one of the 
first to link ideological beliefs (like religious fundamentalism) and cognitive style 
to dehumanization (see also Hodson & Costello, 2007). 
The current theoretical perspective posits that dehumanization can serve a 
function for religious fundamentalists. Specifically, it is theorized that 
dehumanization—and the discriminatory behaviors that follow—help to protect 
the validity and vitality of the beliefs of fundamentalists. This should especially 
be the case for groups who are perceived to violate important religious values and 
beliefs (Brandt & Reyna, in press; Jackson & Esses, 1997; see also Reyna, 
Brandt, Viki, & Hughes, 2010; Henry & Reyna, 2007), and thus threaten them 
(Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). This reasoning is consistent with research that 
suggests that prejudice and discrimination directed towards members of groups 
that violate norms and traditions can be used to bolster one’s cultural worldview 
(Das, Bushman, Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, 
Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland et al., 1990; Solomon, Greenberg, & 
Pyszczynski, 2000). In a similar manner, the fundamentalist worldview may be 
protected through dehumanization and prejudice. Figure 2 illustrates the 
protective function of dehumanization and discrimination for religious 
fundamentalists. 
To be clear, the current model suggests that religious fundamentalists will 
only demonstrate prejudice and discrimination towards value violating groups. 
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For example, research has documented a relationship between fundamentalism 
and implicit prejudice towards gays (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Gays are 
perceived to violate traditional family values (Henry & Reyna, 2007); religious 
fundamentalists find this value to be important, so therefore fundamentalists show 
prejudice towards gays. Conversely, fundamentalism is not related to implicit 
prejudice towards Blacks (Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, LaMartina, McCullers, & 
McKinley, 2006) and Blacks do not necessarily violate values and beliefs of the 
religious. While there may be third variables that appear to connect 
fundamentalism and prejudice towards Blacks (e.g. political conservatism) 
fundamentalism itself is not predicted to be the cause of anti-Black prejudice (see 
also, Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). 
Sanctification  
Sanctification is “a process through which aspects of life are perceived as 
having divine character and significance” (Pargament & Mahoney, 2005, p. 183). 
In terms of the chain of being, sanctification refers to the perception of people or 
groups as more than human, if not divine. Perceiving people as good and right, 
even sacred, can be a very positive thing. Haidt (2003) described people who 
experienced the emotion of elevation as having a desire to help other people and 
to make the world a better place. Sanctification is related to the promotion of 
sanctified values and behaviors. For example, people who sanctify the 
environment are more likely to make donations to environmental causes 
(Tarakeshwar et al., 2001); people who sanctify their marriages are more likely to 
have stable marriages (Mahoney et al., 2003); and people who sanctify their 
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Figure 2 
Theoretical model of the protective function of religious fundamentalism. 
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strivings are more likely to spend time on those goals (Mahoney, Pargament et al., 
2005). In general, the sanctification of values and relationships promotes these 
values and relationships. Similarly, it would be expected that groups who uphold 
one’s values would be sanctified; thus, the sanctified group would be more likely 
to receive support for its values and relationships. 
The perception of one’s group as sacred may have beneficial 
psychological outcomes that serve to promote the individual well-being of group 
members, but also the group’s goals. Identification with a relevant group is 
beneficial to an individual’s psychological well-being, including self-esteem 
(Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000; Bizumic, Reynolds, Turner, Bromhead, & 
Subasic, 2009; Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009; Verkuyten & 
Hagendoorn, 2002), life-satisfaction (Outten et al., 2009), positive affect 
(Bizumic et al, 2009), and other health related behaviors (Haslam, Jessten, 
Postmes, & Haslam, 2009), suggesting that perceptions of one’s group is integral 
to the perception of the self. Research has also suggested that identification with a 
group leads one to act on their group’s behalf, whether that is collective action for 
low-status groups (Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009) or support for the current 
status hierarchy for high-status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Other relevant 
group memberships, such as those in the workplace, can also lead to more work 
involvement (Bizumic et al., 2009). For religious fundamentalists it would be 
expected that sanctification would predict individual well-being, as well as 
support for the group in terms of worship service attendance, donations, volunteer 
service, and other group serving behaviors. In this sense, sanctification may be a 
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special case of ingroup favoritism (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and identification. This 
theorizing suggests the theoretical model in Figure 3 for the promotion function 
of religious fundamentalism. It is important to consider sanctification as past 
research on dehumanization and infra-humanization has primarily assumed that 
the perception of a person or group as human was the top of a continuum between 
animality and humanity (Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al, 2001, 2003; but see 
Demoulin et al., 2008; Haslam et al., 2008). This one sided focus may be 
detrimental to understanding the full capacity and complexity of humans’ 
psychologies. For example, measures of humanness may not successfully capture 
the perception of a person or group as more than human. Indeed, infra-
humanization seems to be related more to outgroup derogation than ingroup 
favoritism (Viki & Calitri, 2008); however this may be because the measure used 
was not sufficient to detect sanctification. 
Importantly, the effects of sanctification are theorized to go above and 
beyond mere positive feelings and include a moral aspect that connects the 
sanctified target with the divine. Thus, while sanctification and positivity are 
likely correlated it is important to demonstrate that perceptions of sanctification 
are predictive above positive affect and similar constructs. One study has 
examined the independent impact of sanctification and positivity. In a sample of 
heterosexual undergraduate college students imbuing sex with sacred qualities 
(e.g. holy, spiritual, blessed) was related to increased levels of sexual behavior 
(including intercourse), and more positive reactions to sexual intercourse after 
controlling for general positive attitudes towards sex (N. Murray-Swank,
16 
 
 
Figure 3 
Theoretical model of the promotion function of religious fundamentalism. 
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Pargament, & Mahoney, 2005). Other evidence suggests that vertical perceptions 
of the divine are independent of likability (Meier et al., 2007). Overall this 
research suggests that sanctification is more than general positive regard and 
includes connections with the divine.   
The protection and promotion functions associated with the 
dehumanization and sanctification aspects of the chain of being have been 
presented here as easily separable consequences of fundamentalists’ perception of 
humans along the chain of being. However, these consequences cannot always be 
so easily disentangled, as these two functions can work in tandem. For example, 
in terms of the environment, donating money to an environmental protection 
agency promotes the environment by investment, but that investment also serves 
to indirectly protect the environment. Similarly, protection and promotion may 
not be easy to disentangle for religious fundamentalists. Opposition to gay 
marriage not only protects religious fundamentalists’ conception of family values, 
it can also provide media attention that may serve to recruit members and bolster 
a sense of legitimacy (i.e. promotion). 
Divinity Differential 
The difference between ingroups and outgroups on the chain of being 
leads to one of the more unique predictions utilizing the chain of being. The 
difference between an ingroup and an outgroup on the chain of being is called 
here the “divinity differential” and is proposed to be the result of perceived 
differences and threats to an ingroup’s values. Furthermore, the divinity 
differential is expected to mediate the relationship between value violations and 
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efforts to protect the ingroup. This proposition is consistent with recent research 
demonstrating that greater perceptions of human-animal similarity is related to 
less extreme actions taken against the outgroup (Costello & Hodson, 2010). The 
divinity differential is also consistent with research suggesting that perceived 
differences in attitudes predict less cooperative, and greater competitive, behavior 
in an effort to solve differences (Kennedy & Pronin, 2008). The logic of the chain 
of being expands past dehumanization research and suggests that the differences 
in perceptions of ingroups and outgroups represented by the divinity differential 
can take place anywhere along the continuum of the chain of being. Rather than a 
focus on humanity as a starting point, such that only groups falling below 
“human” face discrimination, the divinity differential and the chain of being 
suggest that greater ingroup-outgroup differences, whether those differences are 
above or below the conceptual midpoint of “human,” result in greater protection.  
Rationale (Study 1) 
 The purpose of the present studies was to test the hypotheses related to the 
chain of being (Study 1), especially in regards to religious fundamentalism (Study 
2). The primary goal of Study 1 was to assess whether people perceived other 
groups (Blacks/African-Americans, Christians, Gays), animals, and supernatural 
beings (God and Satan) along a chain of being—from less than to more than 
human. Participants rated a variety of target groups and entities on measures of 
sanctification (Mahoney, Pargament, Murray-Swank, & N. Murray-Swank, 2003) 
and humanness (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam, Bain, Douge, Less, & Bastian, 
2005). While other studies have used a variety of target entities, including 
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supernatural agents, animals, and humans (Demoulin et al., 2008; Gray, Gray, & 
Wegner, 2007; Haslam et al., 2008) these studies have primarily focused on how 
these entities can be described in terms of human characteristics. The current 
study extends this type of inquiry by including a measure of sanctification, which 
goes beyond past research that has assumed that the perception of a person or 
group as human was the top of a continuum between animality and humanity (e.g. 
Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al, 2001, 2003). The use of measures to assess the 
sanctification of an ingroup can help determine if people are capable of 
sanctifying the ingroup.  
Study 1 also assessed the emotions associated with perceptions of 
humanness and sanctification. Haidt and his colleagues (2003; Haidt & Algoe, 
2004) have suggested that disgust is related to the perception of people as below 
human on a chain of being and that more positive moral emotions (e.g. elevation, 
admiration) are related to the perception of people as more than human. Three 
negative (i.e. disgust, anger, contempt) and three positive (i.e. awe, admiration, 
and gratitude) moral emotions were measured and compared to the measures of 
humanness and sanctification. Based on the work by Haidt and colleagues, it was 
predicted that the more a person or group is perceived as sanctified and human 
the less anger, disgust, and contempt will be directed towards them. The more a 
person is perceived as sanctified the more admiration, gratitude, and awe will be 
directed towards them. The potential relationship between humanness and 
positive moral emotions is unclear because humanness may not represent the 
perception of others as more than human. It is important to note that while many 
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scholars have used measures of emotions as proxies of dehumanization (Esses, 
Veenviet, Hodson, & Mihic, 2008; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Taylor, 2007), there 
has not been any research examining how felt emotions relate to measures of 
humanness. Thus the current research will be able to assess the appropriateness of 
the comparison of different measures of humanness and dehumanization to 
emotions.  
Finally, the last portion of Study 1 contained a preliminary examination of 
a measure intended to assess perceptions along the chain of being more directly. 
Similar to the classic feeling thermometer or the ladder of subjective social status 
(Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, Ickovics, 2000), this measure of the chain of being 
asked participants to rate their perception of a variety of target groups on a scale 
of zero to 100 with zero labeled as the ultimate evil and 100 labeled as the 
ultimate good. Importantly, this measure was displayed as a vertical continuum to 
highlight the proposed vertical nature of perceptions of groups along the chain of 
being (see Figure 4).  
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Figure 4 
Moral thermometer used in Studies 1 and 2. 
 
Statement of Hypotheses (Study 1) 
 As illustrated throughout the previous section several hypotheses can be 
derived from the proposed model of the chain of being. The hypotheses that will 
be tested in Study 1 will be formally restated. 
Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis Ia. Independent of general positive regard, target groups will 
be perceived along a dimension of sacredness according to their position on a 
chain of being, such that God will be perceived as the most sacred, the Devil as 
the least sacred, the human groups someplace in the middle, and animals slightly 
lower than the human groups. The self was predicted to fall someplace between 
the human groups and God, because humans, especially from Western cultures, 
tend to self-enhance (Diener & Diener, 1996; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & 
Kitayama, 1999).  
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 Hypothesis Ib. Independent of general positive regard, target groups will 
be perceived along a dimension of humanness according to their position in a 
chain of being,  such that the Devil will be perceived as the least human, the 
human groups will be perceived someplace in the middle, and animals will be 
perceived someplace between the Devil and the human groups. Again, the self 
will be perceived as slightly more human than the human target groups. 
Importantly, no specific prediction is made about God. While God is theorized to 
be perceived as more than human along a chain of being, past research suggests 
that measures of humanness do not capture the perception of targets as more than 
human. That is, the items used to measure humanness might not apply to God. 
Hypothesis II 
Despite the general tendency for human groups to be perceived near the 
middle of the chain of being it is expected that an ingroup will be perceived as 
more human and more sacred than outgroups.  
Hypothesis III 
 Hypothesis IIIa. The perception of a target group as sacred will be related 
to greater feelings of awe, gratitude, and admiration and less feelings of disgust, 
anger, and contempt towards that target group. 
 Hypothesis IIIb. The perception of a target group as human will be related 
to less feelings of disgust, anger, and contempt directed towards that target group. 
There are no specific predictions regarding humanness and the positive moral 
emotions. 
Exploratory Research Questions 
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If the moral thermometer is used in place of the measures of humanness 
and sacredness, how do the results using the moral thermometer compare to the 
humanness and sacredness results? How do differences between ingroups and 
outgroups on the moral thermometers predict perceived humanness, sacredness, 
and the expression of moral emotions? 
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CHAPTER II  
METHODS (STUDY 1) 
In the first study, participants completed an online survey that included 
measures of humanness, sanctification, and six moral emotions (i.e. anger, 
disgust, contempt, awe, gratitude, and admiration) as experienced in relation to 
eight target groups.  
Participants 
A total of 339 participants were recruited from an urban Midwestern 
university for partial course credit in an introductory psychology course. After 
removing participants who did not respond to a substantial portion of the survey 
(i.e. more than 50% of the survey was incomplete), there were a total of 333 
participants (98 men, 233 women, 2 other/no report) who ranged in age from 16 
to 50 years old (M=20, SD=3.17). There were 232 participants who identified as 
White/Caucasian, 42 as Latino/a, 16 as African-American/Black, 43 as other 
ethnicities or multiracial. Two hundred and eleven participants identified as 
Christian, 71 as not religious, and 51 as other religious identifications (e.g. Sikh, 
Agnostic). 
Procedures 
Subjects were directed to a website with a consent form. If participants 
consented to participate in the study they were taken to the survey’s website, 
where they completed ten sets of measures as well as demographic information. 
The questionnaire was designed to include eight primary target entities as eight 
within-subject variables. The primary target entities included God, Devil, Self, 
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Animals, Whites/Caucasians, Blacks/African-Americans, Christians, and Gays. 
After completing the survey the participants were taken to a debriefing webpage. 
Measures 
Complete measures can be found in Appendix A. 
After completing demographic information participants were asked to 
complete a thermometer styled rating scale in regards to ten target entities 
including the entities of primary interest to this study. For every entity listed the 
participants rated the entity from zero to 100, where 100 indicated very favorable 
feelings and zero indicated very unfavorable feelings. This measure served as a 
control variable to help rule out the alternative explanation of positive affect. The 
additional entities were Terrorists and Saints. These two groups were included for 
the extra information they could provide about the chain of being in relation to 
the new chain of being measure—the moral thermometer (see below).  
Following the feeling thermometer participants completed measures of 
humanness, sanctification and moral emotions for the eight primary target 
entities. For each entity participants completed five sanctification items, six 
humanness items, and six moral emotion items. All items were completed on a 
seven point scale ranging from 1=Not at all to 7=Very much. The sanctification 
and humanness items were presented in the same sequence. Participants were 
asked “To what extent do you characterize Yourself with the following traits?” 
where “Yourself” was subsequently replaced with each of the target entities. The 
five sanctification items were derived from Mahoney and colleagues (Mahoney, 
Pargament, A. Murray-Swank, & N. Murray-Swank, 2003) measure of 
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sanctification and included Awesome, Inspiring, Heavenly, Sacred, and Blessed. 
The six humanness items were taken from Haslam and colleagues work on 
perceptions of humanness (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Haslam et al., 2005). Three 
positive and three negative characteristics were chosen that were rated in previous 
studies as being uniquely human, but not human nature. This was done to select 
words that most clearly represented characteristics that separate humans from 
animals. The six items were Broadminded, Conscientious, Humble, Disorganized, 
Rude, and Stingy. Reliabilities of the sanctification and humanness measures for 
each target entity are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Cronbach’s Alpha (α) for measures of humanness and sanctification. 
Humanness 
Target Entity α Target Entity α 
You .46 Whites/Caucasians .80 
God .62 Blacks/African-Americans .70 
Devil .63 Gays .70 
Animals .76 Christians .63 
Sanctification 
 α  α 
You .83 Whites/Caucasians .91 
God .97 Blacks/African-Americans .92 
Devil .86 Gays .91 
Animals .91 Christians .95 
 
After completing measures of sanctification and humanness participants 
responded to six items regarding moral emotions experienced in regards to the 
target entities. The six moral emotions examined were contempt, anger, disgust, 
gratitude, awe, and admiration. Participants were asked “To what extent do you 
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feel contempt for Yourself?” where “contempt” and “Yourself” were subsequently 
replaced with the five remaining moral emotions and seven remaining target 
entities, respectively. 
 Finally participants completed the new measure of the chain of being. 
Similar to the feeling thermometer completed earlier in the survey, participants 
were asked to rate ten target groups on a scale from zero to 100 where zero 
indicated the ultimate evil and 100 indicated the ultimate good. An integral part of 
this measure is a picture of a vertical line connecting the Ultimate Good on the 
top and the Ultimate Evil on the bottom (see Figure 4, p. 19). This vertical 
illustration aims to capture the vertical metaphor, if not perceptual reality (cf. 
Meier et al., 2007) of the chain of being. Two additional groups, saints and 
terrorists, were added in order to examine additional “links” on the chain of being. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS (STUDY 1) 
 The first and second hypotheses suggest that there will be evidence of a 
chain of being in social cognition with both the measure of sacredness 
(Hypothesis Ia) and humanness (Hypothesis Ib) while holding constant general 
positive regard towards the target entities. Furthermore it was predicted that this 
evidence would vary by participants’ ingroups (Hypothesis II). To test this latter 
hypothesis participants’ ingroup was defined by their religious (Christian or non-
Christian) or ethnic/racial (White or Non-White) self-categorization. To test the 
predictions of the chain of being an 8 (Target Entities) X 2 (Religion: Christian or 
Non-Christian) X 2 (Ethnicity: White or Non-White) linear mixed-model with the 
first factor as a within-subjects factor was analyzed for each of the dependent 
measures while controlling for general affect directed towards each of the eight 
target groups. In this analysis, main effects of Target Entity indicated tests of 
Hypothesis I and interactions of Target Entity and the identification (religious and 
ethnic) factors indicated tests of Hypothesis II. Ninety-five percent confidence 
intervals were used to compare target groups. 
Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis Ia 
Hypothesis Ia suggests that target groups will be perceived along a 
dimension of sacredness according to their position on a chain of being, such that 
God would be perceived as the most sacred, the Devil as the least sacred, the 
human groups someplace in the middle, and animals slightly lower than the 
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human groups. The self was predicted to fall someplace between the human 
groups and God. There was a significant main effect for target entity on perceived 
sacredness, F(7, 327.22)=484.17, p <.001 (Top Panel, Figure 5)1. In support of 
the chain of being participants perceived God (M = 5.63, SE = .07) as 
significantly more sacred than all of the other target entities. The Devil (M = 1.28, 
SE = .05) was perceived as the least sacred compared to all of the other target 
entities. The self (M = 4.42, SE = .07) was perceived as significantly more sacred 
than all of the target entities except for God, where the self was perceived as 
significantly less sacred. The human target entities were perceived towards the 
middle of the chain of being. There were, however, differences between the four 
human targets. Specifically, Whites (M = 3.75, SE = .08) and Gays (M = 3.80, SE 
= .08) were perceived as significantly less sacred than Blacks (M = 3.98, SE = 
.09) and Christians (M = 4.07, SE = .08). Finally, contrary to the predictions of 
the chain of being, Animals (M = 4.33, SE = .10) were perceived as significantly 
more sacred than any of the human groups (but not the self). 
Hypothesis Ib 
Hypothesis Ib suggests that target groups would be perceived along a dimension 
of humanness according to their position along a chain of being, such that the 
Devil would be perceived as the least human, the human groups would be 
perceived someplace in the middle, and animals would be perceived someplace 
between the Devil and human groups. The self was predicted to be perceived as 
slightly more human than the human groups. There were not specific predictions 
made about God. There was a significant main effect for target entity on 
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Figure 5  
Estimated sacredness (top panel) and humanness (bottom panel) means for the 
eight target entities. 
 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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perceived humanness, F(7, 321.82) = 62.55, p < .001 (Bottom Panel, Figure 5). In 
support of the hypotheses of the chain of being, the Devil (M = 2.68, SE = .07) 
was perceived as the least human. Animals (M = 3.02, SE = .08) were perceived 
as significantly more human than the Devil, but less human than the human target 
entities. The self (M = 4.24, SE = .05) was perceived as the most human. God and 
the human groups were perceived in between the self and the animals. Blacks (M 
= 3.79, SE = .06) and Gays (M = 3.69, SE = .06) were perceived as more human 
than God (M = 3.43, SE = .06), Christians (M = 3.47, SE = .06), and Whites (M = 
3.48, SE = .07), who were all perceived as equally human.  
Hypothesis I Summary 
When examining both the measure of humanness and the measure of 
sacredness one can find evidence for a chain of being in the perception of social 
groups, animals, and supernatural beings. In general, the results suggest that 
humans are attributed a moderate amount of humanness and sacredness, which 
places them at the middle of the proposed chain of being. As expected the Devil 
was attributed the lowest levels of humanness and sacredness suggesting that the 
Devil falls at the bottom of the chain of being. On the other end of the chain of 
being, God was perceived with the most sacredness, though only a moderate 
amount of humanness. 
 The results that indicate that God was perceived as merely human suggest that 
the measure of humanness may not effectively capture the perception of groups 
and Gods as more than human.  
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The primary unexpected finding comes from the ratings of animals. For 
the humanness measure animals conformed to expectations falling somewhere 
between the Devil and the human groups. However, contrary to the hypothesis 
animals were attributed more sacredness than the human groups. 
Hypothesis II 
 Hypothesis II suggested that perceptions of the target groups on measures 
of sanctification and humanness would be moderated by participants’ religious 
and ethnic identification, such that participants would perceive their ingroups as 
more human and more sacred than outgroups. 
Sacredness 
Christians (M = 4.04, SE = .06) tended to perceive the other target entities 
as more sacred than non-Christians (M = 3.77, SE = .08), as indicated by a main 
effect for the religious identification factor, F(1, 340.76) = 7.04, p = .008. This 
main effect was qualified by the significant interaction between the target entities 
and religious affiliation, F(7, 348.78) = 5.33, p < .001 (Top Panel, Figure 6). An 
examination of the parameter estimates reveals that this interaction was driven by 
a significant interaction between religious affiliation and the Christian target (B = 
.25, SE = .11, p = .03). This interaction indicates that the perception of sacredness 
of the target entities depends on one’s religious affiliation. Consistent with 
predictions, Christians perceived Christians (M = 4.46, SE = .10) as significantly 
more sacred than non-Christians perceived Christians (M = 3.68, SE = .14). 
Indeed, Christians perceived Christians as more sacred than any of the other 
human groups, providing some evidence that ingroups are perceived as more 
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Figure 6 
Estimated sacredness means for the eight target entities as a function of 
religious(top panel) and ethnic (bottom panel) identification. 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
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sacred than outgroups.  There was also a marginally significant interaction 
between religious affiliation and the Devil target (B = -.20, SE = .11, p = .07), 
such that non-Christians (M = 1.34, SE = .07) perceived the Devil as more sacred 
than Christians (M = 1.21, SE = .05).  
There was also a significant main effect for the ethnicity factor, F(1, 
332.76) = 11.78, p = .001, such that non-Whites (M = 4.08, SE = .09) perceived 
the target entities with more sacredness overall than Whites (M = 3.73, SE = .06).  
This main effect was qualified by an interaction between the target entities and 
participant ethnicity, F(7, 331.87) = 4.54, p < .001 (Bottom Panel, Figure 6). This 
was primarily driven by the Devil target (B = .32, SE = .11, p = .004). There was 
no difference between non-Whites (M = 1.23, SE = .08) and Whites (M = 1.33, SE 
= .05) when the Devil was the target entity. However, for all other target entities 
non-Whites perceived more sacredness than Whites for all groups. This pattern of 
results provides ambiguous evidence for the impact of an ingroup on the 
perception of sacredness. While Whites (M = 3.83, SE = .10) perceived Blacks as 
less sacred than did non-Whites (M = 4.13, SE = .15), Whites (M = 3.65, SE = 
.09) perceived other Whites as less sacred than did non-Whites (M = 3.85, SE = 
.14). The perception of Blacks and Whites did not differ for Whites, but non-
Whites perceived Blacks as more sacred than Whites. Thus it appears that non-
Whites perceive other non-Whites (i.e. Blacks) as more sacred than the White 
outgroup. This pattern of results, however, is not significant in White participants. 
For the sacred measure there were no other significant interactions. The 
interaction between religion and ethnicity was marginally significant, F(1, 
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331.48) = 3.70, p = .06. This interaction suggests that for Whites, non-Christians 
(M = 3.50, SE = .09, 95% CI 3.33, 3.67) attributed less sacredness overall 
compared to Christians (M = 3.97, SE = .07, 95% CI 3.83, 4.10). However for 
non-Whites, non-Christians (M = 4.04, SE = .14, 95% CI 3.77, 4.32) attributed 
the same degree of sacredness as Christians (M = 4.12, SE = .10, 95% CI 3.92, 
4.32). 
Humanness  
There was no significant main effect for participants’ religion, F(1, 
339.09) = 1.89, p = .17, however there was a significant interaction effect, F(7, 
342.99) = 5.41, p < .001 (Figure 7). This was primarily driven by the interaction 
with the Devil target (B = .30, SE = .10, p = .003). Christians attributed more 
humanness to the Devil (M = 3.04, SE = .08) than did non-Christians (M = 2.33, 
SE = .11). Unlike the measure of sacredness, the measure of humanness did not 
appear to capture ingroup-outgroup differences for Christians and non-Christians. 
There was a main effect of ethnicity on the attribution of humanness, F(1, 
331) = 12.22, p = .001, such that non-Whites (M = 3.61, SE = .06) attributed more 
humanness to the target entities than did Whites (M = 3.34, SE = .04). There were 
no other significant main or interaction effects. 
Hypothesis II Summary  
Overall, the tests for Hypothesis II suggest that one’s group membership 
can impact their perception of other people, animals, and supernatural entities in 
terms of humanness and sacredness. The specific hypotheses of the chain of 
being, however, received only limited support. Ingroup and outgroup differences 
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Figure 7   
Estimated humanness means for the eight target entities as a function of religious 
identification. 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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were only manifest on the measure of sacredness when examining attributions of 
sacredness as a function of religious identificaiton. It may be that perceiving 
people along the chain of being is especially tied to religious reasoning, an idea 
consistent with the theorizing in this paper on religious fundamentalism. Non-
whites did percieve Blacks as more sacred than Whites; however, it is difficult to 
tell if this effect reflects ingroup favoritism as the sample only consisted of 16 
African-American/Black participants. The lack of clear ingroup-outgroup 
differences as a function of ethnicity was unexpected. 
The humanness measure also provided little support of Hypothesis II. 
There were no differences in perceptions of humanness as a function of ethnicity; 
however, there was one interaction with the Devil target. This interaction 
suggested that Christians were more likely to attribute humanness to the Devil 
than were non-Christians. While this interaction does not provide support for the 
a priori hypothesis, it does suggest that people may differentially utilize the chain 
of being. Specifically, Christians, who are more likely to believe that the Devil is 
an active force in the universe, may be more likely to attribute human 
characteristics to the Devil than are non-Christians, who are less likely to believe 
the Devil plays a role in the world, if they even believe the Devil exists. This 
suggests that perceptions of agency may play a role in a entities placement along 
the chain of being (cf. Gray, Gray, & Wegener, 2007). 
Hypothesis III 
 The third hypothesis suggests that the perception of groups as sacred will 
be related to higher levels of positive moral emotions such as awe, gratitude, and 
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admiration and lower levels of negative moral emotions such as contempt, 
disgust, and anger. Similarly the measure of humanness was predicted to be 
negatively related to contempt, disgust, and anger. No specific hypotheses were 
made about the relationship between humanness and the positive moral emotions. 
The third hypothesis was tested by examining the relationships between the chain 
of being measures (sacredness and humanness) and the six moral emotions while 
partialing out positive affect. The results of these analyses are presented in Figure 
8. Each bar in Figure 8 represents the partial correlation between the humanness 
or sacredness measure and the listed moral emotion. Each bar within each moral 
emotion represents a different target group. 
 The top panel of Figure 8 illustrates the partial correlations of perceived 
sacredness and the six moral emotions while controlling for general affect. The 
measure of sacredness was consistently and significantly related to the three 
positive moral emotions (M r = .43). The results for the negative moral emotions 
were more mixed (M r = -.01). While several correlations were in the predicted 
negative direction, many were non-significant and several others were significant 
in the positive direction. All of the significant positive correlations resulted from 
the measure of contempt, which suggests that there may be something particular 
to contempt contributing to this pattern of results. Anger, in general, was not 
significantly related to perceptions of sacredness. However, for Christians, it was 
significantly negatively related to sacredness, with the exception of God (albiet 
non-significantly). Finally, the disgust measure was the most reliable negative 
emotion predictor of sacredness, with significant results for both Animals and  
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Figure 8 
 
Partial correlations between perceptions of sacredness (top panel) and 
humanness (bottom panel) and the six moral emotions for each of the eight target 
entities. 
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Note: Each bar represents the partial correlation between the humanness or sacredness measure 
and one of the moral emotions while controlling for positive affect. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
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Christians and non-significant results that trended in the predicted direction for all 
other target entities. The bottom panel of Figure 8 illustrates the partial 
correlations of perceived humanness and the six moral emotions while controlling 
for general affect. The results for the humanness measure were varied. 
Humanness was positively related to the positive moral emotions except for the 
self and (for admiration) the Devil (M r = .23). The negative moral emotions were 
all either non-significantly or significantly positively related to humanness, which 
is contrary to Hypothesis IIIb (M r = .13).  
Hypothesis III Summary 
  With the exception of contempt, the measure of sanctification was, in 
general, related to the moral emotions in the predicted manner. This is important, 
because these emotions are often considered proxies for the perception of others 
as less than, and more than, human (Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Maoz & McCauley, 
2008; Taylor, 2007).Thus, it may be the case that the measure of sanctification 
more clearly captured the chain of being dimension compared to the measure of 
humanness.  
While not predicted, the measure of humanness was consistently related to 
the three positive moral emotions. Unexpectedly, and contrary to predictions, for 
several target entities it was also positively related to the three negative moral 
emotions. The cause of this unexpected pattern of results is unclear. It is possible 
that for a group to be the recipient of moral emotions it first must be considered at 
least partially human (e.g. have agency and intention) and thus worthy of moral 
consideration (cf. Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, 2006); however this is 
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contrary to fMRI research that suggests than dehumanized groups elicit feelings 
of disgust (Harris & Fiske, 2006).  
Exploratory Questions 
 The secondary purpose of Study 1 was to examine the use of a moral 
thermometer as an alternate measure of the chain of being. The moral 
thermometer could potentially provide a method to capture the perceptions of 
people as above and below human using a single measure---something current 
measures of humanness do not accomplish. Moreover, the measure is very brief 
and thus a potential easy to use method of capturing dehumanization and 
sanctification. First, the relationship between the moral thermometer and the 
measures of sacredness and humanness for each of the target groups was 
assessed. Following these analyses the hypotheses analyzed with the humanness 
and sacredness measures will be tested, along with a preliminary examination of 
the divinity differential. 
 Figure 9 contains the Pearson correlations for each of the target groups for 
both the measure of humanness and sacredness when predicting ratings on the 
moral thermometer. The moral thermometer was a consistent predictor of the 
measure of sacredness (M r = .43). Judging by the absolute value of the 
correlations it can be seen that on average the moral thermometer is a better 
predictor of the sacredness measure than the humanness measure. However on 
average the moral thermometer is a significant positive predictor of the 
humanness measure (M r = .17), suggesting that the moral thermometer captures 
at least some aspects of humanity of most of the target groups.  
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Figure 9   
Correlations between perceptions of sacredness, humanness and the moral 
thermometer for each of the eight target entities. 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Hypotheses I and II. In order to re-explore Hypotheses I and II, the same 
analytic strategy was used as above. Specifically, a 10 (Target Entities) X 2 
(Religion: Christian or Non-Christian) X 2 (Ethnicity: White or Non-White) 
linear mixed-model with the first factor as a within-subjects factor was analyzed 
with the moral thermometer as the dependent measure, while controlling for 
general affect directed towards each of the eight target groups. As before, a main 
effect of target group was a test of Hypothesis I and interactions between 
religious or ethnic identity and target groups were tests of Hypothesis II. 
There was a main effect of target entity on perceived level of morality, F(9. 
327.81) = 501.47, p < .001 (Figure 10). Results from this analysis largely support 
the predictions of the chain of being. God was perceived as the most moral (M = 
85.40, SE = 1.08) and the Devil as the least moral (M = 5.83, SE = .95). Terrorists 
(M = 10.23, SE = .93) were perceived as more moral than the Devil, but less 
moral than all other target entities. Gays (M = 64.58, SE = 1.13) and Christians 
(M = 65.90, SE = 1.13) were the least moral of the human target groups. Blacks 
(M = 67.37, SE = 1.06) were significantly more moral than gays, but not 
significantly different than Christians. Whites (M = 69.52, SE = 1.06) were 
perceived as the most moral human group. The Self (M = 75.15, SE = 1.07), 
Saints (M = 77.07, SE = 1.31), and Animals (M = 77.85, SE = 1.10) were all 
similarly moral. However, Animals were significantly more moral than the self, 
and saints did not differ from the self or animals. There were no other main 
effects. 
There was a significant interaction between the target groups and religion 
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Figure 10  
 Estimated moral thermometer means for the ten target entities. 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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factor, F(9, 347.53) = 2.49, p = .009 (Figure 11). Christian participants (M = 
68.79, SE = 1.38) perceived Christians as more moral than did non-Christians (M 
= 63.00, SE = 1.86), however this was only marginally significant (B = 2.17, SE = 
1.26, p = .09). There was a significant interaction between religious identification 
and the Devil target (B = -3.31, SE = 1.47, p = .03). Non-Christians (M = 8.41, SE 
= 1.53) perceived the Devil as more moral than did Christians (M = 3.24, SE = 
1.14). 
Finally, there was a significant 3-way interaction between target group, 
religion, and ethnicity, F(9, 328.06) = 2.14, p = .03 (Figure 12). The 3-way 
interaction suggests that non-Whites who are Christian (M = 75.28, SE = 2.64) 
and non-Whites who are non-Christians (M = 78.64, SE = 3.62) perceive Saints 
similarly. However for Whites, non-Christians (M = 71.72, SE = 2.38) perceive 
saints as significantly less moral than Christians (M = 82.65, SE = 1.77).  
Hypothesis III. The same analysis of partial correlations as with the 
sacredness and humanness measures was conducted with the moral thermometer 
(Figure 13). The results primarily resemble the results from the measure of 
sacredness such that for a majority of the target groups the positive moral 
emotions were positively related to the moral thermometer (M pr = .17). Again, 
there was no relationship between the moral emotions and the moral thermometer 
for the Devil, perhaps due to floor effects. Results were less conclusive for the 
negative moral emotions (M pr = -.05). None of the correlations were 
significantly in the opposite direction, but many (especially for contempt) were 
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Figure 11   
Estimated moral thermometer means for the ten target entities as a function of 
religious identification. 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 12 
 
Estimated moral thermometer means for the ten target entities as a function of 
religious and ethnic identification. 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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 Figure 13 
Partial correlations between the moral thermometer and the six moral emotions 
for each of the eight target entities. 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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trending in that direction. For several groups (i.e. God, Gays, and Christians), 
especially with the disgust and anger measures, there were significant negative 
correlations, as predicted. Thus, the moral thermometer and the sanctification 
measure displayed similar relationships among the moral emotions. While the 
sanctification measure resulted in larger effect sizes than the moral thermometer 
for the positive moral emotions (see Figure 9), the moral thermometer was a more 
consistent predictor of negative moral emotions than the sacredness measure. 
This analysis suggests that the moral thermometer may capture a part of the chain 
of being as measured by positive moral emotions; however, for the negative 
moral emotions, the moral thermometer may not be as complete of a measure.  
Exploring the Divinity Differential 
 Finally, preliminary analyses examining the divinity differential were 
conducted. The divinity differential was examined with two ingroups, Whites and 
Christians. For each analysis participants from the ingroup in question were the 
only participants selected. Each target groups’ score on the moral thermometer 
was subtracted from the ingroup’s score. Then, for each ingroup, the correlations 
between the difference score and the measures of humanity and sacredness were 
computed. If the difference score was an effective predictor of humanity and/or 
sacredness then a negative correlation would be expected.  
As can be seen in the top panel of Figure 14, for Christians there was a 
relatively consistent negative correlation between sacredness and the difference 
score for many of the target groups (M r = -.19). Results were less consistent for 
the measure of humanity with only one negative significant correlation (M r = -
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.05). The bottom panel of Figure 14 represents the results for the White 
participants. There was a consistent negative relationship between perceived 
sacredness and the difference score (M r = -.33). Again the humanity measure 
was less consistent (M r = -.13). Importantly, however, there were three negative 
significant correlations and the non-significant correlations trended in the 
predicted direction. 
Summary of Exploratory Questions 
 Overall, it appears that the moral thermometer captures some 
aspects of both humanness and sacredness.  Specifically, the moral thermometer 
was related to both the measure of sacredness and humanness for most of the 
target entities. As a result, the moral thermometer produced similar results as the 
sacred measure when comparing the target entities, and examining the moral 
emotions. Furthermore, differences between an ingroup and the target entities on 
the moral thermometer were predictive of sacredness, and at times humanness, 
suggesting that the moral thermometer may be an appropriate measure of the 
divinity differential. Nonetheless, the moral thermometer was an inconsistent 
predictor of the negative moral emotions, albeit a more consistent predictor than 
the sacredness measure and a more theoretically consistent predictor than the 
humanness measure. Overall, these results suggest that the moral thermometer 
captures some aspects of the chain of being, in a similar manner as the measure of 
sanctification. 
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Figure 14 
Correlations between the moral thermometer difference scores and the measures 
of humanness and sacredness using Christians (top panel) and Whites (bottom 
panel) as the ingroup. 
 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Christian Participants 
White Participants 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 1) 
People can perceive other humans as less than human, even animal-like 
(Goff et al., 2008; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2003). Study 1 represented the 
first attempt to examine the possibility of humans perceiving others humans as 
more than human, even God-like. If people perceive others as both more and less 
than human it would suggest that these two dimensions may be indicative of an 
overarching chain of being that organizes people’s social cognitions. Overall, the 
hypotheses of the chain of being received mixed support.  
Study 1 investigated participant’s perceptions of god, the devil, human 
groups, the self, and animals on dimensions of humanness or more than 
humanness (sanctification). The results from Study 1 demonstrated that people do 
perceive a variety of social targets along a dimension of humanity that appears to 
include the perception of some entities as more than human and some entities as 
less than human. While the evidence was not incontrovertible, taken as a whole 
the data from Study 1 suggested that a study of humanness that does not allow for 
the possibility of the perception of others as more than  human, may be an 
incomplete view of human’s social perception. Specifically, participants viewed 
God and the Devil at opposing ends of the sanctification measure. Human groups 
and the self were perceived between the God and the Devil, as predicted by the 
chain of being. Furthermore, perceptions of sanctification were positively related 
to positive moral emotions (an indication of being greater than human, see e.g., 
Haidt & Algoe, 2004) and negatively related to two out of three negative moral 
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emotions (an indication of dehumanization, see e.g., Maoz & McCauley, 2008; 
Taylor, 2007).   
Perceptions of humanness revealed similar results. The devil was 
perceived as the least human with animals slightly more human, and the human 
groups coming next. God was perceived to be as human as many of the human 
groups. At first blush this may be contrary to the hypothesis, but as discussed in 
the introduction, past measures of humanness may not effectively capture the 
perception of people as more than human (cf. Viki & Calitri, 2008). 
 Despite the overall encouraging results of Study 1, the data did present 
some ambiguity. First, with both the sanctification and humanness measures only 
one of the ingroup-outgroup analyses attained statistical significance. Second, for 
the sanctification measure, animals were one of the most sanctified entities 
examined. Third, the measure of humanness was often positively related to the 
negative moral emotions, opposite of the predicted effect. There could be several 
explanations for these findings. The ingroup-outgroup results may be due to 
social desirability concerns present in a university sample (e.g. Henry, 2008). The 
sanctified nature of the animal targets may be due to the particular animals 
participants had in mind when completing the measures, as in some 
circumstances people attribute humanness to animals (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 
2007). People have very friendly relations with many of their pets, even bringing 
them into restaurants and cafes. Thus, if participants were thinking about their 
pets, instead of some sort of wild animal, they may have been more likely to 
perceive the animals as more sacred. It should be noted that this only explains the 
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results for the measure of sanctification, but not of humanness. Analyses with the 
measure of humanness suggested that animals were perceived as less human than 
the human groups and more human than the devil—consistent with the 
predictions of the chain of being.  
Finally, the measures of humanness may have been positively related to 
the negative moral emotions because in order for humans to feel an emotion for a 
particular group or person, especially a moral emotion, that social target usually 
must have some sort of agency (cf. Gray et al., 2007). Humanity, almost by 
definition, contains a sense of agency (Gray et al., 2007; Haslam, 2006). Thus, a 
social target must be at least partially human to be the target of moral emotions, 
negative or positive. This latter point is interesting, because it throws doubt onto 
the measure of humanness or onto the use of emotions to connote humanness. 
Likely, there are many different conceptions of humanity (e.g. Bandura, 2002; 
Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2003; Maoz & 
McCauley, 2008). The negative moral emotions capture part of this, while the 
measure of humanness used in the current study captured another part. Given 
these findings, the measure of sanctification may best capture the sense of 
humanness conveyed by the emotions used in Study 1. More research is 
necessary to understand precisely what aspects of humanness are measured by the 
variety of measures of humanness. Such work would be beneficial for not only 
providing further insight into the results from the present study, but also for the 
integration of past work on dehumanization.  
Study 1 also provided valuable information about a potential new measure 
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of perceived morality. The moral thermometer was predictably related to both 
perceptions of sanctification and humanness. The results of this measure, for both 
the perceptions of the target groups as well as expressed emotions, were 
theoretically consistent (with the exception of the rating of animals). The moral 
thermometer also allows for the perception of targets as above and below human 
along the same scale, rather than independent humanness and sanctification 
scales. Overall, these results suggest that when the moral component of humanity 
is of interest, a simple measure like the moral thermometer may be an efficient 
and effective choice, however more work is needed to fully validate this measure.  
 Study 1 provided mixed evidence in support of the specific chain of being 
proposed here; however there was strong support for a chain of being. Results 
suggested that participants hierarchically arranged the target groups from less 
than human (the Devil) to more than human (God), with many of the human 
groups falling between these two endpoints. Study 2 aimed to extend research on 
the chain of being by testing the hypotheses regarding the chain of being and 
religious fundamentalism. By combining research on the chain of being, values, 
religion, and cognitive style, Study 2 is able to test a model of fundamentalism 
that includes both prejudicial and psychologically beneficial fundamentalism 
outcomes.  
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CHAPTER V 
RATIONALE AND HYPOTHESES (STUDY 2) 
The purpose of Study 2 was to assess the entire model of religious 
fundamentalism and how it relates to the chain of being, promotion, and 
protection (Figure 1, p. 12) with path analysis. More specifically, Study 2 tested a 
model of religious fundamentalism that included the theoretical models of 
promotion and protection developed previously (see Figures 2 & 3, pp. 11 & 13). 
A traditional measure of fundamentalism that focuses on the belief in an infallible 
authority and closed-mindedness towards religious issues (Altemeyer & 
Husberger, 2004) and the need for closure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) 
were utilized to measure fundamentalism and one of the contributing factors (i.e. 
need for closure) to both fundamentalism and the chain of being. The promotion 
portion of the model was examined with religious well-being, time spent 
volunteering, amount of money donated to religious organizations, and worship 
service attendance (see Figure 2).  
The protection portion of the model included measures that utilized gay 
men and lesbians as the target group because research suggests that this group is 
consistently perceived to  violate fundamentalist values (Jackson & Esses, 1997; 
see also Brandt & Reyna, in press; Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Laythe, 
Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Mavor & Gallois, 2008; Rowatt, LaBouff, 
Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009; Rowatt, Tsang, Kelly, LaMartina, McCullers, & 
McKinley, 2006).  Additionally, measures of value violations and threats, the 
humanness measure from Study 1, and opposition to public policies that deny 
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civil rights to Gays were used to measure the protection portion of the model (see 
Figure 3). Importantly, perceptions of African-Americans were also assessed in 
order to demonstrate that the effects discussed here are specific to value violating 
and threatening groups (e.g. Gays). 
Study 2 also tested the divinity differential hypothesis using measures of 
value violations/threats as the predictor variable, a computation of the divinity 
differential as the mediator variable, and opposition to public policies as the 
outcome variable. It is important to note that the divinity differential may be 
computed in a variety of ways. For example, it could be possible to subtract an 
ougroup’s level of humanness from an ingroup’s level of sanctification; however, 
because it is the difference between humanness (or if reverse scored 
dehumanization) and sanctification—the two directions on the chain of being—it 
is conceptually and computationally suspect. The two measures likely contain 
different sorts of responses from participants and thus scores on the two scales 
will not necessarily be equivalent. It could also be possible to compute the 
divinity differential by taking the outgroup’s level of sanctification or humanness 
and subtracting it from the ingroup’s levels of sanctification or humanness, 
respectively. These two methods, however, suffer from the same pitfalls as 
previous dehumanization research in that the perception of a group as more than 
human is lost with the latter method and with the former method the same 
problem arises only in reverse. Thus, the moral thermometer used in Study 1 was 
used to compute the divinity differential in Study 2. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
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 The primary hypothesis tested in Study 2 was the complete model (Figure 
15). The need for closure was expected to contribute to religious fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism, in turn, was predicted to be related to the perception of gays as 
violating and threatening values as well as perceptions of the ingroup as 
upholding values. Value-related perceptions were, in turn, expected to predict 
perceptions of the ingroup and outgroup along the chain of being as represented 
by the measures of sanctification and humanness, respectively. Finally, ingroup  
sanctification was predicted to relate to individual and group promotion related 
behavior, while the dehumanization of the outgroup was predicted to relate to 
public policy. This hypothesized model was also tested using the sanctification 
measure or the moral thermometer for both the ingroup and the ougroup. 
The secondary hypothesis tested the divinity differential. This hypothesis 
suggests that the difference between participants’ ingroup and an outgroup on the 
moral thermometer will mediate the relationship between the perception of value 
violations and opposition to public policy designed to help benefit the outgroup. 
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Figure 15 
Hypothesized path model (Study 2). 
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CHAPTER VI 
METHODS (STUDY 2) 
The purpose of the second study was to test the chain of being within the 
model of religious fundamentalism using an online survey methodology. 
Participants completed measures assessing their belief in an infallible authority, 
dispositional need for closure, perceived sanctification, humanness, and morality 
of the ingroup and outgroup, the protection of the ingroup from the outgroup, and 
the promotion of the ingroup. The target groups in this study were 
Blacks/African-Americans and gay people. These two groups are some of the 
most often examined within research on the religion-prejudice relationship, so it 
will be important to test the predictions of the model with these two groups.  
Participants 
Participants were recruited from a Midwestern university, where they 
received partial course credit.  Overall 348 participants participated in the survey, 
including participants from a variety of religious groups. Because the current 
study was interested in the sanctification of participant’s religious ingroups and 
the institution where the study was completed is primarily Christian, only the 
responses of Christians were analyzed, leaving a total of 223 participants (59 men, 
164 women). Participants were primarily White (58.3%), Hispanic (19.3%), or 
Black (9.0%). In an effort to maintain a sufficient number of participants, missing 
values were replaced with series means for all measures. 
Procedures 
Participants were directed to a website, where they saw a consent form. 
61 
 
After consenting to participate in the study, participants were taken to the 
survey’s website, where they were asked to fill out a variety of measures 
assessing all the portions of the model. After completing the survey the 
participants were taken to a debriefing webpage.  
Measures 
 The questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. The items and scales used 
in this study are described next. The Cronbach’s Alphas, means, and standard 
deviations for the final scales are reported on the diagonals of the correlation 
matrix found in Table 2 (p. 61). 
All variables were measured on a seven-point scale from 1=strongly 
disagree to 7=strongly agree unless otherwise noted. After completing 
demographic information, participants completed a measure regarding their belief 
in an infallible authority—Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) short form 
religious fundamentalism scale. The religious fundamentalism scale contains 12 
items such as “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness 
and salvation, which must be totally followed” and “Scriptures may contain 
general truths, but they should NOT be considered completely, literally true from 
beginning to end” (reverse scored). Higher scores indicate greater religious 
fundamentalism. 
In order to maintain topical consistency within the questionnaire, items 
assessing promotion of the religious ingroup were presented next. To assess 
promotion of the religious ingroup, five items were used to assess participants’ 
religious behaviors. The first three items were free response and included: (1) 
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“Approximately how much money (in dollars) did you donate to a religious cause 
in the last year (congregation, missions, temple, etc.)?” (2) “On average, how 
many hours a week do you spend volunteering or working for your religious 
group?” and  (3) “In the past year, approximately how many hours have you spent 
talking to others about your faith?” The fourth item assessed how often 
participants attend religious services. It asked “On average, how often do you 
attend religious services.” Participants were given several response choices 
(1=More than once a week, 2=Once a week, 3=Once a month, 4=Only on special 
holy days, 5=Once a year, 6=Less than once a year, 7=Never, practically never). 
The fifth item assessed a more personal religious expression: prayer. This item 
asked “How often do you pray or commune with God outside of religious 
services?” Participants responded on a scale similar to the previous item (1=Every 
day, 2=More than once a week, 3=Once a week, 4=At least once a month, 
5=Several times a year, 6=Less than several times a year, 7=Never, practically 
never). The three open ended items were significantly skewed. The values were 
log transformed to create more normally distributed measures. Throughout the 
rest of this paper references to these variables represent their logged form. When 
combined into a scale they were standardized. 
The Religious Well-Being (RWB) sub-scale of the Spiritual Well-Being 
scale could be seen as a form of promotion (Ellison, 1983). This 10-item scale 
assesses a satisfying relationship with God. Participants were asked about their 
experiences with God. Items such as “I believe that God loves me and cares about 
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me” and “I don’t have a personally satisfying relationship with God” (reverse 
scored) make up the religious well-being sub-scale.  
Webster and Kruglanski’s (1994) 42-item need for closure scale was used 
to measure dispositional need for cognitive closure. This scale consists of five 
subscales including Preference for Order (10-items; “I find that a well ordered life 
with regular hours suits my temperament.”), Preference for Predictability (8-
items; “I don't like going into a situation without knowing what to expect from 
it.”), Decisiveness (7-items; “When faced with a problem I usually see the one 
best solution very quickly.”), Discomfort with Ambiguity (9-items; “When I am 
confused about an important issue, I feel very upset.”), and Closed Mindedness 
(8-items; “I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a 
group believes.”).  
Next, participants completed a measure of sanctification and humanness in 
reference to Gays, Blacks/African-Americans, and Christians. These were the 
same measures as Study 1. Following these measures, participants completed the 
new chain of being measure used in Study 1 for the target groups. 
 Participants then completed a series of items to assess the perception of 
gays, Blacks/African-Americans, and Christians as (a) violating religious values 
and beliefs and (b) threatening religious values and beliefs. Items were reversed 
scored for Christians to represent the perception of Christians as upholding 
values. Four items measured religious value violations and included “Typically, 
gays do not uphold the values of my religion,” “Typically, gays disagree with the 
teachings of my religion,” “Typically, gays do not uphold the traditions of my 
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religion” and “There are very few differences between the values of gays and 
members of my religion” where “gays” was subsequently replaced with 
“Blacks/African-Americans” and “Christians.” Two items measured threats to 
religious values and beliefs and included “Typically, gays threaten the vision of 
my religion” and “Gays threaten the expression of my religion” where “gays” was 
subsequently replaced with “Blacks/African-Americans” and “Christians.”  
Finally, participants completed items assessing protection in the form of 
discrimination via political policy preferences. All items were assessed on a scale 
ranging from 1=strongly oppose to 7=strongly support. Two items were used for 
both gays and Blacks/African-Americans. These items were “Do you strongly 
support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to substantially increase federal 
spending in support of the civil rights of gays” and “Do you strongly support or 
strongly oppose: A ballot measure to substantially decrease federal spending in 
support of the civil rights of gays” where “gays” was subsequently replaced with 
“Blacks/African-Americans.” Four additional items were also used to tap into a 
broader range of policy preferences towards gays. The items included “Do you 
strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure that would legalize gay 
marriage and would allow same-sex married couples all the same benefits of 
heterosexual married couples, including tax and insurance benefits;” “Do you 
strongly support or strongly oppose: A constitutional amendment that will define 
marriage as something that can exist only between a man and a woman;” Do you 
strongly support or strongly oppose: Laws designed to protect gay people from 
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discrimination in the work place;” and “Do you strongly support or strongly 
oppose: Laws designed to restrict gay people from adopting children.” 
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CHAPTER VII 
RESULTS (STUDY 2) 
 The primary hypothesis tested in Study 2 included the entire proposed 
model, tested using structural equation modeling (see Figure 15, p. 53). The 
hypothesized model was tested using the structural model presented in Figure 16. 
After testing the model, mediation analyses were used to test the hypotheses 
regarding the divinity differential. 
Preliminary Analyses 
Only the need for order, preference for predictability, and closed-
mindedness need for closure subscales were used because of their importance in 
past research on fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, in press). Specifically, 
decisiveness and the aversion of ambiguity, as measured by the need for closure 
scale, do not seem to play a role in fundamentalism. This is also the case with the 
current sample (all r’s < .08, p = ns). Need for order and preference for 
predictability were used to create a latent variable for the current study. Closed-
mindedness did not load highly onto the latent variable (<.40) and was thus 
treated as an independent indicator. Additionally, value threat and value violations 
were used to create a single latent variable. For the ingroup these variables were 
reverse coded so that higher numbers indicate that the ingroup is less threatening 
and upholds values.  
  Preliminary analyses suggested that prayer loaded more effectively on the 
religious well-being variable, creating what will be called private promotion. The 
remaining promotion dependent variable will be called public promotion as it 
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contains more publicly visible behaviors (e.g. attending worship services, 
volunteering). These items were standardized and averaged together. A 
correlation matrix including means, standard deviations, and scale reliabilities 
(Cronbach’s Alphas) can be found in Table 2.  
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Figure 16 
Specification of the hypothesized path model. 
 
Note: CoB = the measure of the chain of being used in the model. Three versions of the hypothesized model were 
estimated using different measures of the chain of being for Christians and Gays (see Table 3). Double-headed arrows 
connecting endogenous variables represent the correlations between errors for the endogenous variables. 
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Table 2  
Correlations, means, standard deviations, and scale reliabilities for all indicators included in path analyses.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Order (.80)               
2. Predictability .59** (.77)              
3. Closed-
Mindedness .03 .21** (.61)             
4. Religious 
Fund. .18** .20** .15* (.90)            
5. Private Prom. .25** .10 -.07 .59** (.94)           
6. Public Prom. .15* .02 -.03 .46** .50** (.73)          
7. Chr. Uphold -.19** -.13* .07 -.09 -.22** -.24** (.85)         
8. Chr. Do Not 
Threaten -.19** -.07 .07 -.05 -.24** -.28** .58** (.69)        
9. Chr. Sanct. .19** -.01 -.10 .31** .26** .24** -.30** -.27** (.95)       
10. Chr. Moral 
Therm. .22** .11 -.01 .37** .29** .32** -.31** -.31** .48** --      
11. Gays Value 
Violation .16* .16* -.01 .17** .10 .03 .01 .06 .02 .002 (.84)     
12. Gay Threat .12 .19** .13* .35** .15* .05 .15* .26** .10 .05 .48** (.64)    
13. Gay 
Humanness -.04 -.06 -.03 -.04 -.09 -.11 -.001 -.01 .36** .05 -.19** -.15* (.60)   
14. Gay Sanct. -.10 -.12 -.12 -.20** -.06 -.09 -.04 -.08 .44** .15 -.33** -.39** .55** (.92)  
15. Gay Moral 
Therm. -.05 -.05 -.04 -.08 .01 .06 -.18** -.20** .24** .51** -.32** -.41** .21** .52** -- 
16. Gay Policy -.13 -.08 -.03 -.30** -.08 -.19** -.02 .03 -.01 .23** -.19** -.39** .05 -.46** -.26** 
M 4.47 4.11 3.42 3.55 5.10 .00 5.90 6.09 4.73 75.26 3.91 2.52 3.82 3.78 66.13 
SD .96 .93 .74 1.26 1.41 .74 1.21 1.20 1.59 20.58 1.66 1.57 1.04 1.67 22.77 
Note: Numbers on diagonal and in bold-face type indicate Cronbach’s α, with the exception of the two threat measures 
and. The reliability of these two-item measures are quantified using Pearson correlations. The two moral thermometer 
items are single item measures and thus have no internal reliability to report. *p<.05,  **p<.01. 
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Importantly, religious fundamentalism was not related to the perception of 
Blacks as violating (r(221)=-.03, p = .64) or threatening religious values 
(r(221)=-.09, p = .20). Fundamentalism was also related to the perception of 
Blacks as more human (r(221)=.16, p = .02). Contrary to predictions, 
fundamentalism was related to more opposition to public policy designed to help 
Blacks (r(221)=.15, p = .05). Despite this finding, these results are consistent with 
the hypothesis that Blacks did not constitute a value violating group for religious 
fundamentalists and thus, would not be dehumanized.  
This pattern of results remains the same if Black participants are not 
included in the sample. For non-Black Christians, religious fundamentalism was 
still unrelated to perceptions of Blacks as violating (r(200)=-.003, p = .97) or 
threatening (r(200)=.07, p = .32) religious values. Contrary to the previous results 
with all participants included, but consistent with the hypotheses, the relationship 
between fundamentalism and opposition to public policy designed to help Blacks 
was not significant (r(200)=.04, p = .56). Additionally, fundamentalists still 
perceived Blacks as more human (r(200)=.14, p = .05). Given these results and in 
order to present a more simplified model, the variables referring to Blacks were 
not included in the final analyses. 
Structural Equation Modeling 
 A series of structural models were fit to the data using measures of 
sanctification, humanness, and the moral thermometer. Table 3 contains the final 
fit statistics for the three hypothesized and final models. Hypothesized models 
indicate models specified according to Figure 16. The first model used the 
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measure of sanctification for Christians, but the measure of humanness for Gays. 
The second model used the measure of sanctification for both Christians and 
Gays. The third model used the moral thermometer for both Christians and Gays. 
As can be seen in Table 3, the hypothesized model did not adequately fit the data 
for any of the three basic models. In order to ascertain a more accurate impression 
of the data all direct effects that were not included in the hypothesized model (e.g. 
paths between closed-mindedness and public promotion, closed-mindedness and 
public policy, Christians uphold and public promotion etc.) were added to each of 
the three models. The final model represents a model where all nonsignificant 
direct paths (with the exception of originally hypothesized direct effects) are 
removed, leaving only significant direct paths.  
The fit for each of the final models can be found in Table 3. All final 
models had adequate fit. While the Chi-square tests were significant they were 
greatly reduced compared to the hypothesized model. Moreover, alternative 
measures of fit produced either good (CFI, RMSEA) or adequate fit (AGFI), 
suggesting each of the final models adequately fit the data. The final models are 
presented in Figures 17, 18, and 19. Bold paths in the figures represent paths 
predicted by the hypothesized model. The factor loadings for the latent variables 
and the correlations between variables for these final models can be found in 
Table 4.  
 Consistent with the hypothesized model, need for closure, as represented 
by closed-mindedness and the desire for predictability and order, predicted 
religious fundamentalism (all Models). The need for closure variables also 
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predicted three variables not originally specified in the hypothesized models (all 
Models). Predictability and order and closed-mindedness predicted perceptions of 
Christians as upholding values. Closed-mindedness also negatively predicted 
private promotion and the perceptions of Christians as sacred (Models 1 and 2) 
and moral (Model 3), such that participants who were less closed-minded were 
more likely to privately promote their religious beliefs and perceive their 
religious ingroup (Christians) as more sacred and moral. 
The protection portion of the model also found support, especially in 
Models 1 and 2. In all three models religious fundamentalism predicted the 
perception of gays as violating and threatening religious values. In turn, 
perceptions of gays as violating and threatening religious values were related to 
the perception of gays as less human (Model1), sanctified (Model 2), or moral 
(Model 3). In turn, perceptions of gays as less human (Model 1) or less sacred 
(Model 2) predicted opposition to civil rights policy for gays. However, when the 
chain of being was measured with the moral thermometer, this relationship was 
not significantly different from zero. In addition to the predicted paths, there were 
several added paths in the final model. Religious fundamentalism directly 
predicted perception of gays along the moral thermometer (Model 3) and 
opposition to civil rights for gays (all Models). Finally, perceptions that gays 
violate and threaten religious values directly predicted opposition to civil rights 
(all Models). 
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Table 3 
Overall model fit for hypothesized and final estimated models. 
Model Name χ2 (df) CFI AGFI RMSEA 
Model 1: Sanct-Hum     
Hyp. Model  308.88 (57)*** .66 .76 .141 (.126, .157) 
Final Model  69.53 (47)* .97 .91 .046 (.020, .068) 
Model 2: Just Sanct.     
Hyp. Model  290.07 (57)*** .72 .76 .136 (.120, .151) 
Final Model  74.85 (48)** .97 .91 .050 (.026, .071) 
Model 3: Moral Therm.     
Hyp. Model  298.77 (57) .71 .76 .138 (.123, .154) 
Final Model  66.43 (47)* .98 .91 .043 (.013, .066) 
Note: The names of the models indicate what measures of the chain of being were 
used. In Model 1 the sanctification measure was used for Christians and the 
Humanness measure was used for Gays. In Model 2 the sanctification measure 
was used for both Christians and Gays. In Model 3 the moral thermometer 
measure was used for both Christians and Gays.  Hyp. Model = model specified 
according to Figure 16. Final Model = models summarized in Figures 17 – 
19.*p<.05,  **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Table 4 
Factor loadings, path coefficients, and correlations for the three final estimated 
models. 
   
Final  
Model 1 
Final  
Model 2 
Final  
Model 3 
     Factor Loadings      
Gays Threat <--- Gays Violate 1.02a .90a .86a 
Gays Violate Values <--- Gays Violate .47*** .53*** .54*** 
Chr. Not Threat <--- Chr. Uphold .82a .81a .83a 
Chr. Uphold Values <--- Chr. Uphold .71*** .72*** .69*** 
Order <--- Pred. & Order .88a .94a .95a 
Predictability <--- Pred. & Order .70*** .65*** .65*** 
     Correlations      
Pred. & Order <---> Closed-Mindedness .08 .05 .05 
Gays Violate Er. <---> Chr. Uphold Er. -.35*** -.36*** -.40*** 
Gays Hum. Er. <---> Chr. Sanct. Er. .45*** --- -- 
Gays Sanct. Er. <---> Chr. Sanct. Er. --- .65*** -- 
Gays Moral Therm. Er. <---> Chr. Moral Therm. Er. -- -- .65*** 
Priv. Prom Er. <---> Pub. Prom. Er. .22*** .23** .23*** 
Pub. Prom.  Er. <---> Gay Policy Er. .13* .15* .16* 
Priv. Prom Er. <---> Gay Policy Er. -.17* -.15* -.16* 
 
Note: *p<.05,  **p<.01, ***p<.001, aindicates reference indicator and thus no 
significant tests were performed on this path. Er. = error. 
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Figure 17 
Final structural model for Model 1 
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths at p>.05. Bolded lines indicate paths contained in the original model. Correlations 
between factors and factor loadings for latent variables can be found in Table 4.
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Figure 18 
Final structural model for Model 2 
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths at p>.05. Bolded lines indicate paths contained in the original model. Correlations 
between factors and factor loadings for latent variables can be found in Table 4.
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Figure 19 
Final structural model for Model 3 
 
Note: Dashed lines indicate nonsignificant paths at p>.05. Bolded lines indicate paths contained in the original model. Correlations 
between factors and factor loadings for latent variables can be found in Table 4.
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The promotion portion of the model received less support. Fundamentalism did 
not predict the perception of Christians as upholding values, likely because the 
Christian sample of participants all believed that Christians upheld religious 
values—a ceiling effect. The perception of Christians as upholding values, 
however, did predict perceptions of Christians as more sacred (Models 1 and 2) 
and moral (Model 3). Contrary to the model, perceptions of Christians as sacred 
(Models 1 and 2) or moral (Model 3) did not predict public or private promotion 
in the final model. There were several additional paths for the promotion portion 
of the model. While religious fundamentalism did not predict perceptions of 
Christians as upholding religious values, it did predict perceptions of Christians 
as more sacred (Models 1 and 2) and moral (Model 3). Religious fundamentalism 
and perceptions of Christians as upholding religious values also significantly 
predicted both public and private promotion (all Models).  
Many of the paths that did not support the full model failed to because the 
direct effects of other variables overwhelmed the impact of the predicted path. 
For example, when examining the raw correlations, perceptions of Christians as 
sacred and moral predicted public and private promotion (see Table 2); however, 
this effect was completely accounted for with the direct paths  of Christians 
upholding values and religious fundamentalism (see Figures 17 – 19). Similarly, 
when just observing the raw correlations, the perception of Gays as less moral 
predicted opposition to public policy (see Table 2); however, when all of the other 
variables were entered into the model (Model 3), perceptions that gays violate 
and threaten religious values and religious fundamentalism accounted for 
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opposition to public policy. Overall, an analysis of the additional paths that were 
added to the model suggests that religious fundamentalism, perceptions of value 
violators and upholders, and even the need for closure variables are more 
proximal predictors than originally theorized. 
Divinity Differential 
 The divinity differential hypothesis suggests that while perceptions of 
value violations and threats will predict opposition to public policy, this direct 
effect will be mediated by the difference between the ingroup (Christians) and the 
outgroup (Gays) on the chain of being. First, the items making up the value 
violation and value threat scales for gays were aggregated to create one five-item 
measure. This measure was reliable (α = .82). The divinity differential was 
computed by subtracting the outgroups score on the moral thermometer from the 
ingroups score on the same measure. The mediation was tested using Preacher 
and Hayes (2008) SPSS mediation macro that utilizes 5,000 bootstrapped 
resamples to create 95% bias and corrected confidence interval. This method of 
testing mediations is more accurate (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) than the traditional 
Baron and Kenny (1986) approach. 
 The results of the mediation analysis and test of the divinity differential 
can be found in Figure 17. Consistent with predictions, value violations and 
threats significantly predicted the divinity differential, which in turn predicted 
opposition to public policy. This indirect effect of value violations through the 
divinity differential was significant (Mediated Effect = .17, SE = .04, 95% CI = 
.10, .27), suggesting that the differential perceptions of ingroups and outgroups 
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along the chain of being is at least partially driven by value violations and 
predictive of protection. 
 
Figure 20 
The divinity differential mediates the relationship between value violations and 
opposition to public policy. 
Note: Coefficients represent unstandardized beta weights. ***p<.001 
 
Value violations 
and threats 
Divinity 
Differential 
Opposition to 
Public Policy 
B = .41***, SE = .06 
 
B = .23***, SE = .06 
B = 6.94***, SE = .91 B = .03***, SE = .004 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION (STUDY 2) 
Study 2 used the chain of being from Study 1 in an attempt to combine 
prejudicial and psychologically beneficial outcomes of religious fundamentalists. 
In this way, Study 2 expanded on the findings from Study 1 by examining the 
antecedents and consequences of perceiving ingroups and outgroup along the 
chain of being. Past research has examined both of these fundamentalism 
outcomes (e.g. Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Pargamen, 2002), but has not 
attempted to combine them into a single theoretical account. The current study 
provided a step in the direction of integration. The model suggested that because 
of religious fundamentalist’s belief in an infallible authority combined with the 
concurrent closed cognitive style lead fundamentalists to view the ingroup as 
closer to God (sacred) and outgroups as closer to animals (dehumanized) on the 
chain of being. These perceptions were predicted to be driven by beliefs that the 
ingroup and outgroups uphold and violate values, respectively. Perceptions of 
ingroups as sacred were expected to predict group promoting behavior, while 
perceptions of outgroups as less than human were expected to predict attitudes 
and behaviors that could serve to protect the ingroup.  
Results from Study 2 provided some support for the full model of 
fundamentalism. Consistent with past research (e.g. Brandt & Reyna, in press) 
and the current model, the need for closure (as captures by preferences for 
prediction and order, and closed-mindedness) predicted religious fundamentalism, 
suggesting that religious fundamentalism provides people with a orderly and 
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predictable lens through which to view the world.  
Protection 
Providing support for the protection portion of the model, religious 
fundamentalism was related to the perception of gays as violating and threatening 
religious values. In turn, these value violations and threats lead to the perception 
of gays as less human. Fundamentalists protected their ingroup against Gays by 
opposing public policies designed to help Gays. These results were confirmed in 
all models tested, with the exception of the model utilizing the moral 
thermometer (Model 3), where the direct effect of value violations/threats 
overwhelmed the impact of the moral thermometer. There were also several 
additional direct paths, suggesting that the model explains only a piece of the 
relationships described here. Overall, these results suggest that religious 
fundamentalists perceive Gays as violating and threatening important religious 
values and are thus dehumanized and denied civil rights. Prejudice by 
fundamentalists is driven and rationalized with values and the denial of humanity. 
Promotion 
The promotion portion of the model received less support. Contrary to 
predictions, fundamentalists did not perceive Christians as upholding religious 
values any more than their non-fundamentalist Christian counterparts.  This 
nonsignificant relationship was likely due to a ceiling effect, whereby the all-
Christian sample primarily perceived Christians as upholding their religious 
values. The means for the two Christians upholding values variables were near 
the top of the possible range of values (5.90 and 6.09 on a 7-point scale). 
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Consistent with predictions, this ceiling effect did not mask the impact of the 
perception of Christians as upholding values on the perceptions of Christians as 
sacred and moral; in all models the perception of Christians as upholding values 
predicted the perception of Christians as higher on the chain of being. 
Unfortunately for the model, perceptions of Christians along the chain of being 
(as both sacred and moral) did not predict private or public promoting behaviors. 
Overall, these result suggest that upholding values is an important determinant of 
one’s placement along the chain of being; however, fundamentalism may not play 
a role in determining Christians’ perceptions of upholding values, and the chain 
of being may not play a role in promoting the ingroup.   
The additional paths, especially in the promotion portion of the model, 
suggest some support for the ideas of the chain of being. While fundamentalism 
was not related to the perception of Christians as upholding values, there was a 
significant direct path from fundamentalism to measures of the chain of being 
(sacred and moral), suggesting that fundamentalists do perceive their ingroup as 
more sacred and more moral than non-fundamentalists, but that this relationship 
may not be driven by perceptions of values. While there may be an unmeasured 
intervening variable, it may also be the case that the cognitive styles (e.g. closed-
minded, preference for order) and specific beliefs (e.g. infallible authority) 
associated with fundamentalism directly influence perceptions of the ingroup as 
particularly sacred and moral. For example, perceiving one’s own group as higher 
on the chain of being may be driven by the preference for an orderly and 
unambiguous view of the world, which may lead people to perceive their own 
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group has higher on the chain of being in an effort to view their own group as 
distinct and independent of other groups (cf. Brewer, 1991).  
Public and private promotion were not predicted by the measures of 
Christian’s sacredness or morality; however, several other constructs significantly 
predicted both public and private promoting behavior. First, and consistent with 
past research (Genia, 1996; Sethi & Seligman, 1993), religious fundamentalism 
was directly related to both public and private promotion suggesting that the 
current sample and measures are consonant with past work in this area.  
Additionally, perceptions of Christians as upholding values predicted both 
kinds of promoting behavior.  This latter result suggests that perceiving an 
ingroup as upholding important values influences behaviors that can serve to 
benefit the ingroup and the self. This argument is implicit in the research on 
symbolic racism (Sears & Henry, 2005) and value violations more generally 
(Henry & Reyna, 2007). This work suggests that people derogate groups who 
violate important cultural values (such as hard work and economic 
individualism)—consistent with the protection portion of the current model. 
Embedded in this literature, however, is the assumption that people in the ingroup 
(often White-Americans) believe that the ingroup upholds these values and thus 
promotes policies and ideologies to the benefit of the ingroup. While not designed 
to explicitly test this idea, the current study provides support for the notion that 
perception of the ingroup as upholding values is important in determining 
attitudes and behaviors in the same way perceptions of the outgroup as violating 
values is important in determining opposition to public policy. 
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Finally, closed-mindedness was negatively related to private promoting 
behavior.  At first glance this result may seem surprising given that closed-
mindedness is often positively related to religious attitudes and behavior (e.g. 
Altemeyer, 2002; Brandt & Reyna, in press). Nonetheless, when all of the 
variables were entered into the model the more open-minded the participants the 
more likely they were to endorse attitudes and behaviors that privately promote 
the ingroup, such as religious well-being and prayer. This result is interesting for 
at least two reasons. First, it suggests that there are personal benefits, including 
religious benefits, to being open-minded. While much of the work on closed-
mindedness has emphasized its detrimental (or in the case of open-mindedness, 
beneficial) consequences in intergroup and interpersonal contexts (e.g. Cohen, 
Sherman, Bastardi, Hsu, McGoey, & Ross, 2007; Kruglanski, 2004), the attitudes 
and behaviors encapsulated in the private promotion variable represent largely 
intrapersonal attitudes. This suggests that closed-mindedness (open-mindedness) 
can negatively (positively) influence a person’s psychological well-being. More 
research is necessary to understand the role of closed- and open-mindedness on 
psychological health.  
Divinity Differential 
Study 2 also provided support for the idea of a divinity differential. 
Importantly, the perception that an outgroup (Gays) violated and threatened the 
values of the ingroup (Christians) increased the difference between Gays and 
Christians on the moral thermometer. The difference, the divinity differential, 
mediated the relationship between the value violations and public policy 
86 
 
positions. These results provide a mechanism for past work examining value 
violations (e.g. Henry & Reyna, 2007). This past research has suggested that 
perceptions of groups as intentionally violating values causes people to perceive 
these value violating groups as less deserving of public aid (Henry & Reyna, 
2007; Reyna et al., 2006, 2009). The current research suggests that in addition to 
deservingness, the relationship between the ingroup and outgroup on a chain of 
being—as measured by the moral thermometer—in part drive the value violation-
public policy relationship.  
The results from the divinity differential also suggests that the relative 
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup along the chain of being may be 
an important determinant of reactions to the outgroup. Most research on 
dehumanization has conceptualized “human” as the top of the hierarchy where 
groups perceived as less than human were likely to face discrimination (Haslam, 
2006; Leyens et al., 2001). The current study revealed that the perception as less 
than human may not be the most important perception to consider. Instead, the 
perception of a group in reference to the ingroup on a scale than can include 
perceptions of groups as more than human may be more important. For example, 
Christians and Gays were both perceived as above the midpoint on the moral 
thermometer, suggesting that they were both perceived as human to some degree. 
Regardless of the absolute value of the perception of Gays along the moral 
thermometer, the difference between the two groups (Christians and Gays) was a 
significant predictor of opposition to public policy. This suggests that Gays might 
not be dehumanized per se, but rather because they are lower on the chain of 
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being than Christians they face discrimination. Research and theorizing on the 
perception of humanity needs to consider the perception of people as more than 
human and the impact this might have on intergroup perceptions of humanity. 
Overall, Study 2 provided support for the psychological underpinnings of 
religious fundamentalism, the protection portion of the model, and the divinity 
differential. Partial support was found for the promotion portion of the model. 
These results suggest that outgroups who violate and threaten the religious values 
of fundamentalists are dehumanized and face derogation in an effort, by 
fundamentalists, to protect their ingroup and its beliefs. While perceptions of the 
ingroup as closer to God do not cause group promoting behavior, religious 
fundamentalists do perceive their ingroup as more sacred and moral and are more 
likely to promote the ingroup than non-fundamentalists. Additionally, the 
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup on the moral thermometer was 
an important determinant of opposition to public policy designed to help the 
outgroup. Rather than the absolute value of a group as moral or unmoral, the 
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup proved to be a significant 
predictor. Furthermore, the current study revealed the value of open-mindedness 
to psychological health. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 Religious fundamentalism and dehumanization have both contributed to 
prejudice, discrimination, intergroup violence and—in some cases—terrorism 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006; Haslam, 2006; Hitchens, 2007; Hunsberger & Jackson, 
2005; Opotow, 1990; Wellman, 2007; see also Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). 
However, fundamentalism has also been linked to better than average physical 
and psychological well-being (George, Ellison, & Larson, 2002; Pargament, 
2002), suggesting that there may be some benefit to holding extreme, 
fundamentalist ideologies. The current study investigated these dual outcomes by 
expanding the dimension of humanity to include the perception of people, 
animals, and supernatural entities as both greater than, or less than human—a 
dimension called the chain of being. 
 Recent theoretical advances have suggested that the perception of humans 
and animals fall along a similar scale, where anthropomorphism describes the 
perception of animals as more human and dehumanization describes the 
perception of people as more animal-like (Epely, Waytz, & Caccioppo, 2007; 
Haslam, 2006).  Others have examined the perception of supernatural beings 
more generally, and God specifically, in terms of humanness and the 
characteristics of humans (Demoulin, Saroglous, & Van Pachterbeke, 2008; Gray 
et al., 2007). The current research, especially Study 1, extends this work by 
examining the perception of supernatural agents, humans, and animals along the 
same dimension.  
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Overall, the current studies suggested that research on humanity that does 
not take into account the perception of humans as more than human may not 
capture the full extent of social perception. For example, in Study 1 the measure 
of sanctification suggested that God was perceived as significantly more human 
than any of the human target groups. However, when using a more traditional 
measure of humanness God was considered as human as several of the human 
groups—a result that is contradictory with both intuition and the empirical work 
on the perception of God (Meier et al., 2007). By using a measure of 
sanctification it was possible to examine a broader range of humanity, including 
the perception of people (and gods) as more than human. The current study was 
the first study to attempt to go beyond “human” in the study and measurement of 
humanness. 
Expanding on the idea that people may be perceived as more than human, 
the current research suggests that the perception of a group as less than human 
(dehumanization) may not be the primary concern for people studying intergroup 
relations. Rather, it is the difference between an ingroup and an outgroup along 
the chain of being—the divinity differential—that results in discrimination and 
the protection of ingroup values and norms. This suggests that a group does not 
need to be seen as less than human to face discrimination. Instead, it is the 
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup that is most consequential. For 
example, consider the situation where an ingroup and an outgroup are both 
perceived to be more than human, but the outgroup is still perceived as lower on 
the chain of being compared to the ingroup. In this situation the current model 
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would suggest that the outgroup would still face discrimination. However, past 
work on dehumanization that considers humanity as the top of the moral 
hierarchy would not necessarily make this prediction because the outgroup was 
not actually dehumanized. In support of this idea, the test of the divinity 
differential in Study 2 suggested that Gays were perceived on the top half of the 
moral thermometer, yet the difference between Gays and Christians on the 
measure predicted opposition to public policy that would help benefit Gays and 
Gay rights.  
The current study also examined several antecedents to the perception of 
humans as above and below human. Specifically, it was proposed that the need 
for closure and religious fundamentalism would influence perceptions of 
Christians and Gays along the chain of being. This research adds to the nascent 
literature examining how ideological beliefs (e.g. conservatism) can influence the 
perception of a group as human (Hodson & Costello, 2007). Religious 
fundamentalism directly, and the need for closure indirectly, were related to the 
perception of the ingroup (Christians) as more sacred and moral. Similarly, both 
fundamentalism directly and the need for closure indirectly related to the 
perception of the outgroup (Gays) as less sacred, human, and moral. Importantly, 
the perception of Gays as less sacred and human was partially mediated by 
perceptions of Gays as violating and threatening religious values. This is 
important for several reasons. First, the results on the antecedents of perceptions 
along the chain of being provide evidence that it is not necessarily purely the 
ingroup-outgroup distinction that drives dehumanization (cf. Leyens et al., 2001). 
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While other researchers have made a similar point (Haslam, 2006; Viki & 
Abrams, 2003), the current research extends this idea by including the need for 
closure and religious fundamentalism as potential causes for the perception of 
humans as more or less than human. Second, these results suggest that the 
ingroup-outgroup distinction may be, in part, a function of the perceived value 
similarity (or dissimilarity) of the outgroup, such that value violations may be 
used to legitimize dehumanization and public policy positions (cf. Henry & 
Reyna, 2007).  
Importantly, the current study did not end with the perception of humans 
as more or less than human. Rather, the model tested the idea that participants 
would attempt to promote a sanctified ingroup and protect against a dehumanized 
outgroup. While there was little support for the former predictions, the protection 
portion of the model did attain support. That is, participants perceived value 
violating outgroups as less human, sacred, and moral. In turn, participants 
opposed public policies aimed at benefiting the outgroup. These results are 
consistent with recent research that suggests groups may use prejudice and 
discrimination as a tool to protect the validity and vitality of their opinions and 
beliefs (Brandt & Reyna, in press). While the promotion portion of the model 
received little direct support, the current study replicated some past work (Genia, 
1996; Sethi & Seligman, 1993) suggesting that fundamentalists are more likely to 
promote their ingroup. Thus, it was not that fundamentalists in the current sample 
did not endorse promoting attitudes and behaviors, but rather these attitudes were 
not directly driven by the perception of the ingroup as sacred and moral.  
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Future Research 
 The two studies presented here opened doors for future research on both 
the chain of being and fundamentalism.  
Study 1 
One of the potential short falls of Study 1 was the number of groups 
participants were asked to rate. This could have aroused social desirability 
concerns. For example, Blacks, a group that continues to face dehumanization 
(Goff et al., 2008), were perceived as the most human of the human groups. More 
focused comparisons (two or three groups, rather than eight) and a between-
subjects design may help reduce social desirability concerns among participants. 
 The unexpected level of sanctification attributed to animals also deserves 
further study. People can anthropomorphize animals, especially pets, viewing 
them as if they were human (Epely et al., 2007). If participants were thinking 
about their pets then anthropomorphization may contribute to sanctification 
levels. A second explanation may involve the amount of moral agency granted to 
animals. If animals are not attributed moral agency and are already perceived in a 
positive light they may be attributed greater levels of sanctification. That is, 
animals may not have the moral agency to fall from grace. Future research that 
attempts to investigate these explanations may benefit by including people’s pets, 
but also animals that live in the wild. Varying levels of threat an animal presents 
(a potentially dangerous wild animal vs. a relatively benign wild animal) may 
also contribute to perceptions of humanness and sacredness of animals. 
 Emotions have been used as proxy indicators of both humanness and 
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saintliness (Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Maoz & McCauley, 2008). The results of the 
current study suggest that this requires further exploration. The current measure 
of sanctification and the moral thermometer suggest that the use of the moral 
emotions as a proxy for humanness and saintliness may be justified; however, the 
measure of humanness provided mixed results. The counterintuitive results 
regarding the humanness measure and the negative moral emotions may provide a 
fruitful avenue for future research. It may be possible that the measure of 
humanness or the emotion measures are not accurate measures of humanity. 
Much of the recent work validating measures of humanness (Haslam et al., 2005) 
have done so by asking participants explicitly if they thought certain traits were 
unique to humans or a part of human nature. There is face validity to this 
approach, however, people may not be able to accurately make these kinds of 
judgments.  
The use of moral emotions to measure dehumanization has been based 
more on theoretical arguments, rather than empirical results. For example, disgust 
has been used as a measure of dehumanization because it represents the reaction 
to people who remind us of our animal-nature (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2000). 
However, it is unclear whether people who are treated with disgust are actually 
perceived as less human. Recent neuroscientific research (Harris & Fiske, 2006, 
2007) has provided some evidence for the use of moral emotions (specifically, 
disgust) for measuring dehumanization. When participants saw targets who are 
stereotyped as cold and incompetent (e.g. the homeless, drug addicts) there was 
significantly less activation in the medial prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain 
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implicated in perceiving social targets (Amodio & Frith, 2006). Additionally, 
when viewing these targets there was increased activation in the amygdala and 
insula regions of the brain, which have been implicated in feelings of disgust 
(Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003). This recent evidence does suggest 
that moral emotions may be a more appropriate measure of dehumanization than 
the measures of humanness used in the current studies. 
Study 2 
 The results from Study 2 also suggest potential avenues for future 
research. The search for mechanisms for the fundamentalism-sanctification and 
fundamentalism-promotion relationships could provide insight into the structure 
and function of fundamentalism. For example, fundamentalism may predict 
sanctification because of the core components of fundamentalism—belief in an 
infallible authority and closed-mindedness about religious issues. By believing 
and attempting to follow an infallible authority fundamentalists may perceive 
themselves as closer to the authority (i.e. closer to God) than people who are not 
attempting to follow the authority to the same extent.  Similarly, promotion could 
be the result of attempting to follow an infallible authority that demands regular 
worship and prayer. Research that attempts to independently measure the 
psychological components of fundamentalism may be able to shed light onto the 
precise mechanisms that make fundamentalism a potent predictor of 
sanctification and group promoting attitudes and behaviors. 
Perhaps most interestingly the negative relationship between the closed-
mindedness and private promotion suggests a potential fruitful line of inquiry. 
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While research has documented many inter- and intra-group effects of closed-
mindedness (for a review see Kruglanski, 2004), the current research suggested 
that there may be intrapersonal effects as well. Importantly, there appears to be 
some benefit to remaining open-minded about issues, especially when predicting 
the private promotion variable in the current study. More research is needed in 
order to determine if this type of effect expands beyond the outcome variables in 
the current study. Overall, the negative relationship between closed-mindedness 
and private promotion is conceptually consistent with theory that suggests that 
authoritarianism represents the lack of efficient strategies for coping with 
uncertainty and anxiety (Oesterreich, 2005). That is, people who are not 
authoritarian would be expected to have better psychological health because they 
have developed better coping mechanisms.  
Research that has examined the impact of value violations on support or 
opposition to public policy has suggested that value violations provide 
information about the deservingness of the policies’ primary beneficiaries (Henry 
& Reyna, 2007; Reyna et al., 2006).  The current study suggested that differences 
between the ingroup and the outgroup along the chain of being (as represented by 
the moral thermometer) at least partially mediates the relationship between value 
violations and opposition to public policy. These two mechanisms are not 
necessarily independent or competing, but rather may work in tandem to drive the 
value violation-public policy relationship. Additional research may attempt to 
integrate these two mechanisms. Perceptions of deservingness may play an 
intervening role between value violations and the divinity differential, suggesting 
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a multiple mediation hypothesis, whereby groups who are not perceived as 
deserving (due to value violations) “fall from grace” and are perceived lower on 
the chain of being (cf. Reyna et al., 2010).  
 The relationships and implied causality examined in Study 2 cannot be 
confirmed based on the results. For example, the model suggests that the need for 
closure underlies fundamentalism and that these two constructs drive perceptions 
of groups as upholding or violating values, perceptions of groups along the chain 
of being, opposition to public policy, and group promoting behavior. It is 
important for future work to manipulate the predictor variables used in this study 
in order to determine if there are causal relationships between the variables, or if 
the variables in the current study are merely co-occurring phenomena. There is, 
however, past research that does suggest the implied causal direction of the 
current work. For example, manipulations of the need for closure and existential 
threat have increased support for ideologies based upon traditional and other firm 
beliefs (e.g. conservatism, Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 
1999). Additionally, it is likely that an ideological belief system, such as 
fundamentalism, informs our perceptions of values, support for public policy, and 
support for group serving behaviors because of the strong set of beliefs the 
ideology represents. However, there may be reciprocal causal arrangements. For 
example, while fundamentalism may initially cause someone to attend church and 
donate money to their religious organization, these actions may, in turn, cause 
someone to become more fundamentalist. The teachings at worship services may 
bolster the initial beliefs and the beliefs may also be a method of rationalizing 
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monetary donations. Research that attempts to carefully test the causal 
relationships between religious beliefs—perhaps by priming religious concepts 
(e.g. Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007)—and related outcome variables would help 
move this area of research forward.  
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CHAPTER X 
SUMMARY 
 Religious fundamentalism has been related to a variety of prejudicial and 
discriminatory attitudes and public policy preferences. However, contrary to 
accounts of fundamentalism as pathological, fundamentalists are physically and 
mentally healthier than non-fundamentalists (Genia, 1996; Pargament, 2002; 
Sethi & Seligman, 1993). The purpose of the current paper was to examine both 
of these fundamentalist outcomes within the same model. 
 In order to capture both positive and negative outcomes of 
fundamentalism the current paper proposed that people perceived others as 
greater than or less than human along a dimension of social cognition called the 
chain of being (cf. Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Lovejoy, 1964/1936). It was proposed 
that religious fundamentalism and the need for would lead participants to 
perceive one’s ingroup as upholding important values. These perceptions would 
lead the ingroup to be seen as more than human and would lead to more group 
promoting behaviors as well as greater psychological well-being; however, 
perceived differences in values would cause some groups to be perceived as 
lower on this chain of being. Groups that are perceived as lower, less than human, 
on the chain of being would also face discrimination as a way to protect the 
ingroup from value violating and threatening outgroups. 
 In order to test these ideas two studies were conducted. In the first study 
participants rated a variety of target groups on measures of humanness (Haslam et 
al., 2005), sanctification (Mahoney et al., 2003), and moral emotions (e.g. 
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disgust, admiration). Results indicated that participants appeared to rate target 
entities along a chain of being, with some entities perceived as more than human 
and some perceived as less than human. Additionally, there was some evidence 
that participants were more likely to rate their ingroup as more than human. This 
latter evidence, however, was mixed. Additionally, a measure of a moral 
hierarchy (i.e. moral thermometer) was developed and compared to the measures 
of humanness and sanctification. Results suggested that this measure captured 
parts of both sanctification and humanness and allows one to measure the 
perception of a person or group as above or below human along the same scale. 
 The second study tested the model of fundamentalism that incorporated 
ideas from the chain of being. Results indicated that fundamentalists’ perceptions 
of an outgroup as violating and threatening religious values lead participants to 
dehumanize and support discrimination against the outgroup. Additionally, the 
differences between participants ingroup and outgroup on a hierarchy of morality 
predicted support for discriminatory public policies. Religious fundamentalism 
was related to the perception of the ingroup as more than human. The perceptions 
of the ingroup did not relate to group promoting behavior; however, 
fundamentalism was a significant and direct predictor of the group promoting 
attitudes and behaviors.  
 Overall these results suggest that a psychology that does not take the 
perception of people as more than human into account does not capture the full 
range of person perception. Furthermore, some religious ideologies may promote 
the view that ones group is more sacred and these beliefs may inspire more 
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support for the religious group. While the results presented in this paper did not 
fully confirm the theory, they do provide insight into new directions for research 
on infra-humanization and religious fundamentalism. 
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Below is a summary of the measures used in Study 1.  
 
We would like to get your feelings about different groups and entities. Your 
honest answer is important to us. Please rate the following groups and entities on 
a scale from 0 to 100. 100 indicates that you feel very favorable, while 0 indicates 
you feel very unfavorable. How do you feel towards: 
0--------------------------------------50-------------------------------------100 
Very      Neutral    Very 
Unfavorable         Favorable 
 
1.  [Insert Target Group] _________ 
For the following sections you will be asked about your perceptions of a variety 
of groups and entities, especially in regards to how you characterize them. Please 
use the following scale to complete all of the following items. Remember your 
answers are completely anonymous and cannot be linked back to you. Your honest 
answer is important to us.  
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
       Not at all                        
Very much 
 
1. To what extent do you characterize [Insert Target Group] with the following 
traits? 
a. Awesome 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
b. Inspiring 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
c. Heavenly 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
d. Sacred 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
e. Blessed 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
f. Broadminded 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
g. Conscientious 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
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h. Humble 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
i. Disorganized 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
j. Rude 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
k. Stingy 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
2. To what extent do you feel [Insert Target Emotion] towards [Insert Target 
Group]? 
1      2            3      4           5      6        7    
Not at all       Very Much 
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People think about others in a variety of ways. Please rate the following groups 
and entities on a scale from 0 to 100. 100 indicates that you perceive the group or 
entity as the ultimate good, while 0 indicates you perceive the group or entity as 
the ultimate evil. How do you perceive: 
 
1.  [Insert Target Group] _________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ultimate 
Evil 
Ultimate 
Good 100 
50 
0 
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Below is a summary of Study 2 measures. Previously used and validated scales 
are indicated by the name of the scale and its citation in brackets. 
 
Please rate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding 
your view of religion. Use the following scale. Remember your answers are 
completely anonymous and there is no way to connect your answers back to you. 
 
1------------2------------3------------4--------------5------------6------------7 
     strongly disagree              strongly agree 
 
[Religious Fundamentalism Scale—Short: Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004] 
 
Please answer the following questions about your religious behaviors. Remember 
your answers are completely anonymous and there is no way to connect your 
answers back to you. 
 
1. Approximately how much money did you donate to a religious cause in the 
last year (congregation, missions, temple, etc.)? 
______ dollars 
 
2. On average, how many hours a week do you spend volunteering or working 
for your religious group? 
______ hours per week 
 
3. In the past year, approximately how many hours have you spent talking to 
others about your faith? 
______ hours 
 
4. On average, how often do you attend religious services? 
<1> More than once a week  
<2> Once a week  
<3> Once a month  
<4> Only on special holy days  
<5> Once a year  
<6> Less than once a year  
<7> Never, practically never  
 
5. How often do you pray or commune with God outside of religious 
services?  
<1> Every day  
<2> More than once a week  
<3> Once a week  
<4> At least once a month  
<5> Several times a year  
<6> Less than several times a year 
<7> Never, practically never 
 
122 
 
Please rate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding 
your experiences with life and religion. Please use the following scale. 
 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
     strongly disagree        strongly agree 
 
[Religious Well-Being Scale: Ellison, 1983] 
 
Read each of the following statements and decide how much you agree or 
disagree with each according to your beliefs and experiences. Use the following 
scale. 
 
1-----------2-----------3-----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7 
     strongly disagree        strongly agree 
 
[Need for Closure Scale: Webster & Kruglanski, 1994] 
 
For the following section you will be asked about your perceptions of a variety of 
groups, especially in regards to their descriptions. Please use the following scale. 
Remember your answers are completely anonymous. You honest answer is 
important to us. 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
             Not at all             Very much 
 
1. To what extent do you characterize [Insert Target Group] with the 
following traits? 
a. Awesome 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
b. Inspiring 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7    
Not at all  Very Much 
 
c. Heavenly 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
d. Sacred 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
e. Blessed 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
f. Broadminded 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
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g. Conscientious 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
h. Humble 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
i. Disorganized 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
j. Rude 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
k. Stingy 
1    2     3     4    5    6   7     
Not at all  Very Much 
 
[Moral Thermometer: Same as Study 1] 
 
Please rate your agreement/disagreement with the following statements regarding 
Christians, Gays, and Blacks/African Americans. Use the following scale. 
 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
     strongly disagree                  strongly agree 
 
______Typically, [Insert Target Group] do not uphold the values of my 
religion.   
______ Typically, [Insert Target Group] disagree with the teachings of my 
religion. 
______ Typically, [Insert Target Group] do not uphold the traditions of my 
religion. 
______ Typically, [Insert Target Group] threaten the vision of my religion. 
______ [Insert Target Group] threaten the expression of my religion. 
 
For this next section we are interested in your attitudes and opinions towards a 
variety of social issues. Please answer the following questions. 
1-------------2-------------3-------------4-------------5-------------6-------------7 
     strongly oppose                strongly support 
 
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to 
substantially increase federal spending in support of the civil rights of African-
Americans/Blacks.   
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to 
substantially decrease federal spending in support of the civil rights of African-
Americans/Blacks.   
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______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to 
substantially increase federal spending in support of the civil rights of Gays.   
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure to 
substantially decrease federal spending in support of the civil rights of Gays.   
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A ballot measure that 
would legalize gay marriage and would allow same-sex married couples all the 
same benefits of heterosexual married couples, including tax and insurance 
benefits.   
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: A constitutional 
amendment that will define marriage as something that can exist only between 
a man and a woman.   
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: Laws designed to protect 
gay people from discrimination in the work place.  
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: Employers should not be 
forced to hire a gay person in that profession if they do not want to.      
______Do you strongly support or strongly oppose: Laws designed to restrict 
gay people from adopting children.      
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Footnotes 
1
  The degrees of freedom contain decimal points because linear mixed-
models utilized slightly different calculations for the degrees of freedom than 
traditional general linear models. 
 
